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About Google Book Search Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at |http: //books .google .com/I jlSarbarli eTollrgf l,ifaratD CHARLES SUMNER SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS "For bcraki rchtdng to Fr^tia uid Fine Arts' Ironclads in Action ^ ^httckf of ^aval Warfare FROM I {^55 lU 1895 'J Ironclads in Action ^ ^hetclj of Slatral ^avfoxe PROM 1855 TO 1895 inrH SOUK ACCOUHT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BATTLESHIP IN ENGLAND BY H. W. WILSON l^(APrA4N A. T. MAHAN, L.S.N 4tTiioii or ** T«i mrLUBNCi or ha power ok aitTOiiv/' etc. WITH MAPS, PLANS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS VOL. I. Boston LITTLE. BROWN AND COMPANY LONDON SAMPSON LOW. MARSTON AND COMPANY Limiied. 1896. V DEDICATION. To §ptn$ct SBil&inson. INTRODUCTION. The reflecting naval world understands in what singular uncertainty all naval problems are at present involved in the apprehensions of men. The develop- ment of the last twenty-five or thirty years has been, not merely extensive and rapid, but continuous and incessant. It has not consisted in a very few sharply defined and sudden changes, to which have succeeded inter\als of tranquillity, allowing men's minds to adjust themselves to the new conditions. Great as the change is, when we contrast the conditions at the opening of the period named with those that now obtain, it has been in the strictest sense gradual. It has not been by bounds, but by a process resembling rather a steady upward progress along a very steep incline. It is true that in this ascent, if it shall so be called, we have had to pass marked features which aid to distinguish one stage from another, and can note in the retrospect certain events which may serve as landmarks, or mile- stones, to measure our progress ; but still, upon the whole, phase has succeeded phase with a degree of continuity, blending one with the other, so as to make vi IXTRODVCTIOX. :: difficult lo say that this year, or that year, definitely K^arked a change of system. At the end we find we h.ive undergone a revolution : but it has been by the gradual and. in one sense, supportable, process of r^tonn. Put. while this graduality of change has spared us :he shvvk. whic^h is caused by a sudden wrench, that r^Y^rrsjes and overturns in an instan: the ordered 5ch^:r.o> o: oar lives, oar professional thought and :r.^:hocs. :: has, on the o:her hand. eniaHed a constant, s:evtrt*. ar.i wearvin;:: srriin of watchfulness and s:j:srv"S<\ wh:oh. in the long rx: rells. perhaps, as !r,;urvc>Iy ufv^n the seIf-possessi>n ar.i rhe judgment. We !Wx*r kivw wha: :: :> :o have our niinds settled . \Yi:h fH;*r^>r.s of average* cec'Sioc o: characrer. and of average ojx^nres^ of rr.:no. :he wider :he atrer.rion paid :o :hc v.v:'::ert:jv>ra:>^Vv.:s vieve^op-tter.: c' r-j.val material, U!*v*er :he advar.vvs of sv^x^noe. :*rte ri:rr i?vibchil and !'t*sieti:tv\: >!u\'.:>^s :o Kxvrr.e :he nzertal aroreciation or e\i^:t:^g kVivIt:ions. Coj^fusron of i-npcessiocL usurps :K^ ^\sio.^ v^f \vvV^-orvlen;Vl ;^-o^es5s•^^**a^ oc'rrior^. evolved tt\>:u ^c'Nsri!^i's:^\^. o'au I'^-e r^ass o: ruLzerial that ^vxs^ics *^t:o the kvowlevlg^' Sro.^-:rr.:< :x'» great for wv^v*. ass;rt>iU:ior. xv. vh^.V. wi:*^ sor::^: :he gert«al !v>U:i ^'< a;.*> sO S.^ x^ a;\u>.^:-o jL>r'^"::;t:Scertce trt the \\v''^ v\i', '.'. ^s vT^-vcsc^s'Sc '.o <-;v-? UT,-^ v::h nhe rush, y%'\'> oi''^o'>i. ',V o\v.v:o'?V' V, or •**:"e^!i.'c: jl'^c iToa^dnation ro; o\0'vC'^N^»''. ••; ;v\uo:^vcr»x'Sv •:< — t»^jid>. through v-:.vivoiNv oJ; cftx* w.uvfuvr^vv:<, :v :*jt.>i" jir^d extreme INTRODUCTION. vii views, adopted from too partial consideration of one set of factors, or too deep impression by them, without regard to qualifying conditions on the other side. Now it is, of course, vain to complain of a state of things which is a characteristic of the age in which we live, affecting all other pursuits that deal with material, as well as our own. The improvement of mechanical processes, urged on by a demand which becomes more and more importunate on the part of the public, and by a competition between inventors growing continually more intense, is limited only by the discoveries of science, which clear the way for the advance. We must perforce accept — and by we I mean, not naval officers only, but all those who feel the importance of navies, and of naval strength, to the countries who possess them — ^a condition of things which IS causing unresting change in the weapons of every kind with which naval war is waged — in ships, guns, armour, engines, and all the appliances which improve their efficiency. But is there, then, no rest for us ? — no approximate certainty ? Must we, too, as rational human beings, to whom a certain skeleton of accepted beliefs and principles is essential for the ordering of our lives, must we, too, as practical men, concerned with one of the most practical of professions, be for ever embarked upon a sea of unrest, undergoing a constant so-called development, but actual revolution, like that of the lifeless weapons which we have to wield ? In a viii INTR OD UCTION, certain sense, of course — ^yes ; we must, of course, keep fully abreast of the times, in so far as to under- stand thoroughly the capacities and limitations of the implements put into our hands; but I hold that we have it in our power, and that too few of us avail ourselves of the fact, to single out of this tangle of inventive energy and change a saving clue of thought, which, entering into our mental constitution, shall serve to steady us, to give repose to our ideas, and directive force to our reflections upon the present and the future, with all their possibilities. In fact, just as in all progress — social, political, economical, what not — there are two principal factors, the conservative and the progressive, so it is in the military professions, including the navy. And, while in politics these factors emphasize themselves into parties, which, whatever their local names, are chiefly characterised by the tendencies the terms imply, it is at the same time true that neither one is wholly untouched by the spirit which chiefly animates its opposite. The conservative will not disavow all wish for change, for improvement ; nor, for the most part, will even the most radical deny the advantage of a certain continuity in national development — a certain conservation of the past in the present, that the goal of the future may be reached more quickly and securely, with less of jar and friction. From this point of view, the average man — average, not in ability, but in equipoise between extremes — will INTRODUCTION. ix probably admit that the conservative factor supplies, at each moment of progress, the solid basis, upon which alone the yet untried fabric of advance can be safely erected ; or, to change the simile, the compara- tively permanent skeleton, upon which the growth and development of the body may proceed without collapsing into formless structural anarchy. From the general character of mind involved in the two tendencies we have just mentioned, it results that the conservative will naturally attach greater import- ance — comparatively tar greater — to principles and methods which have the warrant of experience ; and that even in a proposed advance will seek to frame, or modify it upon lines in general conformity with such experience. In other words his appeal will be to histor}', and it is this very fact which makes the party of consenation — whatever its name in any country — a more potent factor for the well-being of the nation than the party of advance. It treads upon surer ground, it walks by steadier light, it prefers experience to experiment ; it is only when it rejects well-con- sidered experiment, or wilfully shuts its eyes and refuses consent to reasonable probabilities of improve- ment, that it becomes reactionary and desenes to fall. For experience, after all, must be the guide to experiment ; the past must light us on to the future ; so only shall change be well ordered and sure progress, not movement only. Furthermore, when this well-digested master>' of the past and its teaching X INTRODUCTION, exists — exists, not as a mere accumulation of know- ledge, but analyzed, compared, and understood, transmuted into wisdom and formulated into principles — it moves without embarrassment, and without undue anxiety, among the developments of the present. It is more quick to understand, more acute to understand rightly, more prompt to apply to changes of con- ditions the necessary change of action they require, because it is vivified by correct principles firmly held, which readily embody themselves in correct action under circumstances apparently — i,e,^ externally — diverse. In the navy, the element of progress is chiefly represented by the material development of the implements of naval war, which, already revolutionary in the degree of change effected, has not yet reached a pause, despite some evident signs of reaction, of the mark being overshot. It is to be feared that, in this impetuous advance along the whole line, the true spirit of conservatism has not held its due place of consideration. Inertia, apathy, mere opposition to change — because it is change — plenty of such bastard conservatism there has doubtless been; and, as always, it has deservedly gone to the wall, and carried true conservatism, undeservedly, along with it. Progress, development, the last new thing, has had the field pretty much to itself. Did no further harm arise from this, it might be silently borne ; but harm does arise. No profession. INTRODUCTION. xi as no nation, can afford to break with its past. Only in the light of the past can it order its future aright ; not by dumb following of precedents, but by an intelligent acquaintance with past experience, and by the deduction from it of principles, whose life is never measured by the passing day. What one great leader did under one set of circumstances will, when thus thought down, often give light to another under circumstances apparently most diverse ; and even though one particular incident may not be thus fruitful for some other particular situation, from such studies a habit of thought is formed, consciously or unconsciously, which gives right direction, right methods, in seeking the solution of problems that differ in date and external characteristics. There is surely such a thing as imbibing the spirit of a great master, by study of his actions, as well as mere copying his works. Nay, more ; the salvation of a critical moment may come from such illumined knowledge of the past. Has not the great Napoleon, than whom none has more urgently impressed the need of studying histor}% said, ** Upon the field of battle the happiest inspiration is often only a recollection.'* • Strategy and tactics, the highest and noblest exercises of the profession, are, after all, only the adaptation of means to ends. The ends are many and various, the conditions of each case even more different than the ends, and the consequent means xii INTRODUCTION. adopted must, therefore, vary proportionately in external characteristics. Yet there is a practical agreement among authorities, both of the field and of the study, that in history — experience — are to be sought the data, and from the data to be extracted the principles,' 'in whose light alone action can safely be determined. No age nor conditions are excluded ; the names of Alexander and Hannibal are coupled with those of the latest masters of the art. What higher testimony can be imagined to the value of the conservative side of the professions, whose root principles thus run back, in eternal vitality, through the ages — ever old, yet ever new. Yet, if Napoleon be correctly reported as saying that no system of tactics should continue, unchanged, over ten years, we find that the one who gives deserved pre-eminence to the historical, conservative, undying element in the profession he so marvellously adorned, no less insists upon the necessity of the progressive factor in its own proper sphere. Nor is it only in the successes of its most distinguished masters that the history of warfare is instructive. Wide and luminous as would be the field of study thus opened, it by no means exhausts the material which the past offers us, in the experience of mankind at war. The failures as well as the achievements of the great ; the blunders of the incompetent ; errors of' policy ; errors of detail ; fault of organization, of administration ; instances INTRODUCTION. xiii of apathy, sluggishness, over-caution, inadequate preparation ; enterprises small as well as large ; all can carry their share of teachings to one whose mind is either prepared to* detect them, by correct understanding of the elementary principles, or has that native faculty to analyze, and to collate instances, which enables its possessor to formulate for himself the laws of the science he investigates. I recall a quaint yet accurate remark once made to me by a naval officer, which shows how an apt scholar can draw a lesson from the smallest incident. He said that the old Roman legend of the Horatii and the Curiatii illustrated the art of war, though on so small a scale, as truly as the victories of a great captain ; for the one Horatius, having opposed to him three unequally disabled foes, so conducted his battle as to separate them, and destroy them succes- sively, in detail. The disposition, so prevalent a few years ago as to be well-nigh universal, to look upon past naval historj- as a closed book, obsolete for all useful purposes, has in a large measure disappeared. Too many distinguished names have pronounced on the other side for their authority to be disregarded, and men have begun to admit that the sea fights, and the greater sea chieftains of the past, have transmitted tci us lessons as valuable as the great captains of land warfare have to their successors. Yet I question whether, even yet, naval officers in general have come xiv INTRODUCTION. to realize that in looking behind rather than before, in studying the past, near and remote, rather than in speculating upon the future, they will find the solid ground, the conservative basis, the fruitful source and well-spring of principles, by whose clear and steady light they can best meet the conditions of the present — and of the future, when it in turn shall have become the present. When they do so, they will feel that they no longer belong to a profession in a chaotic state of evolution, whose destiny no man can foresee, and of whose principles none can affirm. The clash of opinions will not indeed cease altogether so long as man remains man ; but the common acceptance of such general truths as are deducible from experience, will, by supplying a standard of reference, exclude the rash surmises, or experiments, of less disciplined minds, will control extravagances, and turn the attention of officers, as a class, to the sagacious use of what they have, rather than to disputes about what they will or should have. • What navies now need, in fact, is not so much further advance in material development, in which, as a rule, all share alike, but more general and accurate knowledge of the results already obtained, an appre- ciation of the bearing of those results upon modem practice, and then, finally to apply the teaching of the past to this better knowledge of existing conditions. To such knowledge, the experience of actual warfare is the most important contributor. Scanty indications INTRODUCTION. xv there obtained, are worth much more than the most carefully arranged programme, in which the elements of actual danger, of perplexity resulting from anxious doubt, of the confusion and chances of real battle, cannot be efficaciously represented. How does the report of the battlefield correspond with that of the proving ground as to the realised resistance of armour to guns? Or what is the verdict as to the most efficient distribution of tonnage between larger and smaller vessels ? To the knowledge of results, as evidenced by the test of war, the book now before us gives valuable assistance, by bringing together, in copicfus detail, the various operations of all kinds in which ships have been engaged since i860. Its title, " Ironclads in Action,'* is narrower than its actual scope, for it has inevitably introduced many episodes concerning vessels to which the term Ironclad can scarcely be strictly applied. But, by collating the experiences of vessels of all kinds during these eventful thirty years, it is in form an appeal to history, and that of a period which, if distinguished by few exceptionally striking events, is yet that of the great transition, which has so power- fully disturbed the mental processes and professional convictions of naval officers. It is, therefore, a con- tribution to the very desirable end of disposing men to pause, to reflect, to see really where they have come out at the end of these many years of disquieting hurr)' and change, and to ask, whether, after all, the xvi INTRODUCTION. lessons of the thirty years have changed the funda- mental principles, as derived from earlier days, upon which their future action must be based. If not, the problem now confronted is simply one of adapta- tion, of fitting ancient truths to new conditions. Though for a time perplexed as to methods, we have no need to despond ; for, in proportion as we have assimilated the teachings of the past, we hold in our hands the sure clues that in the future will not mislead us. To recognise and respect this con- servative element, which links the future to the past, and imparts coherence to both thought and action, will be no slight gain. It is the counterpoise needed to balance the often crude and impatient generalizations which are the evil side of that unceasing progress we are prone to vaunt with too little discrimination. A. T. Mahan. AUTHOR'S NOTE. The present work is an attempt to give, with fair detail, a sketch of naval warfare in the period of transition which has followed the introiluction of steam. There are manv excellent accounts of isolated actions or wars, Imt, so far as I know, there is no one book which includes tlicm all, or which affords a means of readv reference to subjects and names. Though the world's experience of naval war has Ixjen very small in the eighty years which have elapsed since the Treaty of Vienna, though there has been no really great and asis of inductions. This material I have endeavoiued to bring together. Strictly speaking, hislorj- is one and continuous, but for [mq)oscs of convenience it may be divided into periods. It was not till 1*^55. when armour was first tested in action, that steam and machinery began to change the outwanl appearance of war at sea. For this reason the present work begins with Kinbum. C apiain Mahan, to whom all of his race owe so deep a debt of gratitude, in his luminous introduction has stated the reasons why men should look for guidance rather to the experience of the past than to the exj)eriments of the future. Without a great European u-ar. an ap|K!al to histor) alone can throw light u|>on these questions which agitate the naval world, and to >»hich Lord Salisbur\- has recently alluded : ** In resj>ect to armaments, nobody yet knows what the torjiedo will do in actual warfare. Nobody yet knows which is llie most impijrtant, the big ironclad or the swift cruiser. Tliese things can only be decided by ex|)erience. You can obtain for any particular o|»inion any collection of ex|)ert authority you wish to get, not l)ecausc expert authority is insincere, but because the human mind is so constituted that a man of great energy and exj)erience always differs from his neighbour who is equally qualified, and while tliat difference, that uncertaintv exists, while we are in that period of 6 xviii AUTHOR'S NOTE. transition, our wisdom is to make ourselves so certainly safe that we can look upon any issue of the experiment with indifference. We must make ourself safe at sea whatever happens." History may not make everything clear and certain, but the abiding principles which can be discerned perhaps, behind the ceaseless flux, will be of no small assistance whether to the individual or the nation. The conception of the work in its present scope and compass is wholly due to Mr. R. B. Marston, to whom I proposed a history of narrower and less ambitious aim. To Mr. Marston my warmest thanks are due for the generous assistance which he has given me at every point, and the great interest he has taken in the book. As far as possible I have gone to the original sources of informa- tion, and I have personally inspected and visited most of the English ships and many of the French ships described. In some cases, how- ever, I have had to fall back upon secondary authorities, especially in the accounts of the war in the East. In Appendix FV. will be found most of the works to which reference has been made, whilst to those marked with an asterisk I would make special acknowledgment. I have striven to obtain accuracy, but with so many names, facts, and figures, it is perhaps too much to be confident that I have altogether succeeded. If it be said " Cecy est un livre de bonne foy," I shall be satisfied. A very considerable proportion of my space has been devoted to the naval events of the American Civil War. A struggle so colossal, so protracted, and of such enduring interest to our race, cannot well be condensed into a few pages. I have exercised a certain selection, omitting for instance, the capture of Port Royal, because it teaches little that is not taught elsewhere. In the chapters on the Blockade, and the Warfare against Commerce, I have gone outside the strict limits of my title. The extreme importance of both subjects may be my justification. So, too, in the Franco-Prussian War there is rather absence of action than action to be chronicled, but here what was not done may be instructive to those who imagine that a fleet can capture fortified ports with little ado. A short sketch of the awakening of Japan has been given to explain the moral superiorit}' which gave the Japanese success. In conclusion, I must thank the authorities of the British Museum Reading Room and Patent Office for their ever ready courtesy and assistance. MAPS AND PLANS. Map ' I. * II. III. IV. ' V. ^ VI. • VII. VIII. • IX. X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. S:vii. XVIII. Face page Hampton Roads 14 Action with New Orleans Forts 48 The Lower Mississippi. Inset, Vicksburg. ... 64 Island No. 10, Port Hudson, Vicksburg, Grand Gulf . 74 Charleston Harbour, with Inset 92 Battle of Mobile. Insets, Mobile Bay, Ramming of the Tennessee . . . . . . , . .122 Second .Attiick on Fort Fisher 140 Ouise of the Alabama ....... 152 Action of the Alabama and Kearsarge .... i6<) The Confutlerate States. Insets, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah 184 The Adriatic . . . . . . . . .216 The Island of Lissa ........ 220 The Battle of Lissa, with three Insets .... 234 Parajijuay, Southern Paraguiiy and Humalta . . . 26*) rhc CicTman Littoral. Insets, Kiel, Kibe, and Jahde . 274 The Black Sea and Batum 2<^ \\\v liatlle of Angamos and the Littoral of Chili and IVru 326 \'hv Bombardment of .Alexandria ..... 340 ILLrSTRATIONS AND ELEVATIONS. PL\rh I. H.M.S. Miijt'stic 11. Kh'v,iiinn> of Monitor and Merrimac III. Sfiiitms of Monitor and Merrimac IV. H..M.S. .Vi/c .... V. W.WS, Royal Sovereign . Face i'a<;k Frontispiece C 10 . 20 h J XX ILLUSTRATIONS AND ELEVATIONS. Plate Face page. '' VI. U.S. Cruiser Chicago 96 • VII. HM.S, Polyphemus 'S^o VIII. The Brenntis 160 ' IX. H.M.S. Blenheim . . . . . . , .174 ' X. HM.S. Daring 2080 • XI. Sinking of the /? XV. The Dupuy-de-Ldme S^^O • XVI. The Huascar 328 'XVII. The Inflexible 338^ XVIII. The Alexandra 350 CONTENTS. PACE l\TKonr(Ti<)N V — xvi I'ROLOGUE. The rAVTlRE OF KlNHl RN. Ihr ironclad dtitt's from ihc Crimean War hattic of Sinopc. Nov. .v»th, 1S53 . Naval Attack on ScbaMopol. Oct. i/lh, 1854 . Napjilcon constructs inmcLid floatinj^j batteries. 1854 riu'ir desij,rn reproduced in Kn^land KxfX'dition against Kinburn .... Xttack on Kinburn. Oct. 17th, 1853 SuM'r«s of the floating batteries .... Srpt 5tH XXXI \xxi xxxi xxxii xxxiii xxxiii XXXV XX xvi (H.XPTKR I. fiiE Monitor \XD THE Merrimac. Naval resi . DfM-ription of the Merrimac ....... KricsNon dcsijjns the Monitor. She is commcncrtl Oil. 2Sth. i8^>l Il«*r striking features ........ Ihf turret I)escripti<»n of the .l/(>Mi/<^r .......<> I nfavourahle criticisms . 1 1 Ihe .North and South race The Monitnrs officers an 5 7 II 13 14 xxii CONTENTS. PAGE The Merriinac comes out to battle, Hampton Roads. March 8th, 1862 15 She sinks the Cumberland 16 Heroic resistance of the Northerners 17 The value of that resistance . • 18 The Merrimac destroys the Congress 19 She retires. Effect of her victory 20 Alarm in the North 21 The ram in action 22 The Monitor at sea 23 — 4 She enters Hampton Roads 25 The Merrimac attacks the Monitor. March 9th, 1862 . . 26 The turret in action 27 — 8 Attempts to ram , . . 28 — 9 Worden is wounded 30 The Merrimac zetxres 31 Damage on either side 32 Results of the engagement 32 — 4 J/^rrtmflc again offers battle. April nth, 1862 ... 35 Fate of the Monitor 36 CHAPTER H. The Capture of New Orleans. Importance of the Mississippi 37 Farragut ordered to capture New Orleans 38 Confederate defences 40 — 2 The boom 42 Bombardment of the forts 43 — ^4 Dispositions of Farragut 45 — 6 The action opens. April 24th, 1862 46 The ships pass the forts 47 — 8 Farragut on the Hartford 49 The ram Manassas ......... 50 The Brooklyn .......... 51 *' The Old Navy wins " 52 Ships which did not pass the forts 53 — ^4 Action above the forts 55 — 6 Consequences of the engagement 56 — 7 Weakness of the defence 57 — 8 Credit due to Farragut 59 Loss of Northerners 60 CONTENTS. XXIII CHAPTER III. The Opening of the Mississippi. PACK Position of Confederates in 1862 61 The North builds a river fleet 62 Attack on Fort Henry. February 6th, 1862 .... 63 Attack on Fort Donelson. February 12 — 13th, 1862 . . 64 — 5 The gunboats at Shiloh. April 6th, 1862 .... 65 The Carondelet passes Island No. 10. April 4th, 1862 . . 66 — 7 Battle of Fort Pillow 68 Battle of Memphis. June 5th. 1862 69 Farrajfut passes Vicksburg. June 28th, 1862 .... 70 i' SkTt^T oi ihc Arkansas 70^! Farra^t passes Port Hudson. March 14th, 1863 . . 74 — 7 Cirant and Porter pass Vicksburjj 78 Attack on Grand (lulf. .\pril 29th, 1863 79 Fall of Vicksburjf. July 4th, 1863 81 Scrvice^ of the Navy 82 — 3 Tactical lessons .......... 84 The ram 84 — 5 CHAPTER IV. The Actions off Charleston. Situation of Charleston . . .... Confederate ironclads attack the blockaders. January 31st i8f)3 IroncKids sent to i)u[>ont .... Exa^f^cratcd ideas of the monitors Dupont attacks Fort Sumter. April 7th, 18O3 Damage ti) the monitors .... Forts against ships . i he Atlanta described .... Her capture by the monit«)rs. June I7lh, iS<»3 Dahlgren rcpUces Dupunt .... Fruitless attacks on the forts S< Kit hern torpedi>es Attack on the Ironsides, October 5lh, 1863 The //ok jd /ante sunk. February 17th, iS<>4. l.o%ses of the North through torpedoes Sfi 87- S 91 92- 4 94— S 96- -7 — I«xi I(HI Itll 10 J !(>4 XXIV CONTENTS. CHAPTER V. The Exploits and Destruction of the Albemarle, Description of the i4/Aewflr/tf Attacks the Northern gunboats. April 19th, 1864 . Second action with the gunboats. May 5th, 1864 Cushing's torpedo attack on her. October 26th, 1864 Coolness of Cushing CHAPTER VI. Farragut at Mobile Bay. Situation of Mobile 114 Confederate defences 115 The Tennessee descv'xhed 116^17 Farragut prepares to attack 119 The ships move in. Aug. 5th, 1864 121 The Hartford in action 122 The Brooklyn stops 123 Farragut crosses the mine-field 124 The Tecumseh is sunk 124 The fleet regains order 1 25 The Tennessee a.ttacks 125 — 26 The forts isolated 127 The Selma and Metacomet . . . . . . 128 The Tennessee renews the battle 129 — 30 She is rammed repeatedly 130 — 31 She surrenders 132 Farragut on his crew 133 The forts are reduced 134 Torpedoes in the Bay 134 CHAPTER VII. The Capture of Fort Fisher. Importance of Fort Fisher 135 Description of the fort 136 — 37 Butler's powder-ship 138 First Bombardment. December 24th — 25th, 1864 . 139 Second Bombardment. January 13th — 15th, 1865 . . . 140 — ^41 The fort assaulted and captured 142 COXTENTS. XXV CHAPTKR VIII. Thk SoiTHKRN Warfare against Commerce. Two types of commerce-destroyer The Sumter. June, 1861 — April, 1862 She is sold at (iibraltar .... Thtr Floruia. January, 1863 — October, 1864 Twice runs the blockade .... Treacherously captured by the Wachusett . Violation of neutral waters .... The sAliihama. August, 1862 — ^June, 1864. Crijiscs in the .Ntlantic . .... Sinks the Hatieras On the junction of the trade-lines X'oyaije to the Kast R« turn^ to CherUmrj'' . .... The Kear surge challenjjed by her .\rt:»»n with the Kearsarge, June 19th, 1864 '!' he Alabama sinks ..... *I he SashvlUe ...... The (t for If in ...... The Rtif*f*ahanoi'k ..... Thr ShenanJoah ...... I he Atlanta ...... Ravajijes oi the commerce-destroyers . (areh-'^'.ness of the North .... l*r<-i;iutions t^uj^j^ested . .... I he (ieneva .\rbilration .... I he protection 5- CHAFn'KR IX. I'lIK Bl.()< K\I)E. TIIK BloCKADE-RiNNKKS, \.NI) International Law. Ktimomic position of the .South I w Paraguay and its tyrant 257— 5S War with Rnizil, L'ruguay, and the Argentine Confederation . 25S liattU' of the Riachuelo. June nth, 1865 2fhi Opcratiun^ round Humaita 262 — (>.; ti<»arding att4 CHAPTKR XII. Nav\i. Kvents of thk Franco-Germ \n War. I hi- uar xji i'oasts ..... I he French fleet in 1M70 . Lacks light-draught vessels The Prussian fleet in 1870 .... Kiel and Wilhelmshaven .... hou«t Willaume/ takes a French squadron to se He enters the B.'iltic I'uuri(.h«in blockades the North Sea littoral I)ifhiuUic<> of the French .... 207 JOS 270 -•7-1 .•75 27«» xxviii CONTENTS, PAGE Dispositions of the Germans 278 Action between the Meteor and the Bouvet, November 9th, 1870 279 Services of the French Navy 280 Forts and ships 282 — 83 Bombardments 284 Want of an expeditionary force 284 CHAPTER XIII. Naval Operations of the Russo-Turkish War. Russian fleet in 1877 286 Turkish fleet in 1877 287 Task before the Turks 289 Loss oi the Lutfi Dj'eltl, May nth, 1877 289 Torpedoing of the Setfe, May 25th, 1877 291 — 92 Attack on the Idjilalieh ........ 293 Attack on Sulina. November 8th — 9th, 1877 .... 295 — 96 Sinking of the Sulina 297 Attack on Turkish fleet at Sukhum KaXL August 24th, 1877 299 — 300 Second attack at Batum. December 27th, 1877 .... 301 — 2 Third attack at Batum. January 26th, 1878 . . . . 302 — 3 Action between the Vesta and Assar-i-Chevket. July 23rd, 1877. 304 — 5 CHAPTER XIV. Actions on the South American Coast. The Huascar molests British steamers 3°^ De Horsey decides to capture her 3^7 The Shah and Amethyst attack her. May 29th, 1877 . . 3^ Little damage on either side 309 — 10 Cruiser versus battleship 3^ * Chili declares war on Bolivia and Peru. November 5th, 1879 . 312 Fleets on either side 312 — 13 Physical conditions 3^4 Battle of Iquique [Esmeralda and Huascar], May 21st, 1879 . 316 Heroism of Prat 316—17 The Esmeralda sunk 3^9 The Covadonga and the Independencia ..... 3 '9 — 20 Strategy of the Jeune ^cole ....... 322 The Chilian fleet sights the Huascar 323 CONTENTS, XXIX PAGE Battle of Angamos [Huascar and the Chilian fleet]. October 8th. 1879 325 Grau is killed 326 The Huascar* s armour riddled 327 Deadly fire of the Chilians 327 — 28 The Huascar strikes 330 Her damages 330 Blockade of Callao 333 Stratagems of the Peruvians 334 Explosion on the Almirante Cochrane ..... 335 CHAPTER XV. The Bombardment of the Alexandria Forts. Revolt of Arabi Pasha . . . . c Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour's Ultimatum. The English Fleet at Alexandria The Egyptian forts General order to the fleet . The bombardment begins. July nth, 1882 I.ord ( harlcs Beresford in the Condor The forts cease fire Lieutenant Bedford lands at Mex l.<»sses on both sides . Damage to the forts Success of the fleet ( onclusions to be dr.iwn Vertical fire Eg\|ttian \ersion of the bomb.'irdment July 10, 1882 33^» 337 338—4" 340—41 34^—43 344 34^> 347 348 35<» 351 353 354 — 55 355 35^> PROLOGUE. THE CAPTURE OF KINBURN. November 17TH, 1855. It is with the Crimean war that the age of the ironclad may be said to begin. Before 1854, inventors had dreamed, suggestions had been put forward, but now these dreams and suggestions were materialised. At Sinope, on November jolh, 1853, for the first time, the deadly effect of shell-fire upon wooden ships was proved in action. A Turkish >c]uadron, consisting of seven frigates, two corvettes, and two ^tt'amers, was at anchor under the guns of a small battery in Sinope Roads.* The Turks were not expecting a Russian attack, and were wholly off their guard. The assailing fleet, under Admiral Xakhimov, consisted of six ships of the line — the Tri Sviatitelia, Rostislav, Tchesmt^, Paris, Empress Maria, and Grand Duke Constantine^ with three steamers. All these ships were of large size and armed with the smooth- bore shell-gun. The action was brief and decisive. The Turkish fleet had no shell-guns, and was simply annihilated ; it was a massacre rather than a battle. Three Turkish frigates were ablaze within a very few minutes, and two transports were sent to the bottom. One steamer escaped to tell the tale ; the others were taken or destroyed. The Russians on their part lost thirty-four killed and 230 wounded, whilst the number of Turks killed and wounded is unknown, but must have been very large. As if to point the moral Vf't more clearly, on October 17th, 1854, a French and English fieri of wooden ships, whilst attempting before Sebastopol to silrnce Fort Constantine, was ver)' roughly handled by the * In addition there were two transports. xxxii PROLOGUE, [1854 Russians. A month earlier, on September 5th, 1854, the Emperor Napoleon had ordered the construction of five floating batteries which were to carry armour. He had before the war caused experiments with plating to be made at Vincennes, and their results were embodied in the new craft. These ships were named the Lave, Tonnantey Congreve, Foudroyante^ and Divastation. They were of 1400 tons displacement, 64 feet long, 42^ feet broad, and had a draught of only 8 feet. Their hulls were of timber upon which was superimposed iron armour 4 inches thick. Their armament was composed of eighteen 50-pounder smooth-bores, and their crew of 280 sailors and forty marines. As originally designed, they were to carry masts and sails, for the mastless ironclad was not a conception which at first appealed to the naval architect. They were fitted with auxiliary steam-power applied through the screw. They had a certain amount of deck protection above the casemate or battery, as the deck over it was of oak, plated with thin iron. They had the germ of a conning-tower in the shape of a bullet-proof iron shelter for the steersman, communicating with the engine-room by means of a voice- pipe. They were ventilated artificially by means of fans, and as there were few openings from the battery, there were not wanting prophets who foretold that at the third round their crews would be suffocated. Others asserted that they never could float, and would be utterly useless for war purposes. When completed and first tried, they were found to sail very badly. Their masts were accordingly replaced by lighter poles which could be removed when clearing for action. Their funnel and bulwarks were arranged to take down so that there should be no projection above the armour. Though they were not seaworthy, and were never trusted upon open waters out of the sight of more orthodox vessels, they were an original conception, and reflected great credit upon the French architects who designed them. They had a heavy sullen ap- pearance in the water, were spoon-bowed, and painted grey. rtSSl PROLOGUE. The design of these vessels was communicated by the Emperor to the English Admiralty, who, not without some mbgivings and considerable delay, ordered, (our similar craft, the Glatton. Meteor, Thunder, and Trusty.* Their displacement was 1469 tons, their length. 172! feet, and their beam, 43 feet 8 inches, whilst the draught was only 7 feet g inches. It was proposed that they should be given triple «CTews, as the small draught of water rendered it impossible to get the power required to propel them satisfactorily out of a single strew, but ihc proposal was never carried out. They had engines of 150 horse-power nominal, and four tubular boilers supplying steam at a pressure of 6oIbs. Like their French prototypes, they were lightly masted, haWng three masts with fore-and-aft rig, and one diminutive funnel. They lay very low in the water, and were pierced in their armoured battery for twelve or sixteen guns. The port-holes were of great siae — 3 feet 4 inches by 3 feet 10 inches — and here was one great weakness. They could, in the words of a contempo- rary writer. " neither steam, sail, nor steer," so that they were not altogether satisfactory. They failed to arrive in sufficient lane to play any part in the war. Aa soon as the French batteries were ready, three of them t were sent out to the East in charge of frigates, and arrived safely at Kamiesch Bay in the Crimea, where they joined the large allied fleet, which, under Admirals Lyons and Bruat, was preparing for an attack upon Ktnburn. The English squadron consisted of six linc-of-battlc ships, mounting 583 guns; »c\-cnleen frigates and sloops, mounting 831 guns; ten gun- boats: MX mo rtar- boats 1 and ten transports. The French •quadron included, besides the floating batteries, four line-of- battle shipK. three con-ctles, four despatch-lioats, twelve gunboatx, and five mortar-l>oals. To distract the attention of the Ruwtans (ram the real objective of the allies, a feint waa * Four tiaiilar )■•■ •onmhat improved balleri« M-prc onletnl in England ■ litlla Uler. Thr luma* n( thi< Mcoiid iMtch were the AilHi. E'riiti. Ttrtat, Mrf Tkmndfi Mt t Th* L«w. r««Mii/r, and IMvt^mtim. xxxiv PROLOGUE. [1855 made against Odessa on October 8th, 1855, after which the whole fleet proceeded to Kinburn. On the 15th, it lay off that place, and preparations for the attack were made, whilst French and English troops were disembarked. The floating batteries stowed away their top-hamper, though they did not strike their funnels. On both this day and the next, the Russian works were shelled at intervals by the gun and mortar-boats, without producing any impression. The Russian works at Kinburn were situated on a long, narrow, and sandy spit, which runs from south to north, athwart the wide and shallow estuary of the Dneiper. On the other side of this estuary is the town of Otchakoff, with Fort Nikolaiev, which, at this time, mounted fifteen guns. At Kinburn there were three works. The main fort lay furthest to the south, and was of stone, bastioned and quadrilateral, with guns mounted in casemates and en barbette. A short distance to the north of this was a battery built of stone, and circular in shape ; whilst to the north of this again was an earthwork. The channel leading into Dneiper Bay passed close under the guns of these works, but it had been already forced without any serious difficulty by six gunboats and steamers. Kinburn was, therefore, isolated ; on land it was cut off by the allied army marshalled across the spit ; to sea- ward were the frigates and line-of-battle ships ; in the Bay, the gunboats. On the night of October i6th — 17th, soundings were taken by the French close under the works, and buoys for the floating batteries were laid down without any casualties, though the boat thus engaged was fired upon by the Russians. At dawn, on the 1 7th, preparations for action were completed. The three ironclads were to steam in to their buoys at a distance of 800 yards from the main fort. The line-of-battle ships were to be drawn up on the starboard quarter of the floating batteries, distant 1200 yards from the main work. The other two Russian works were left to the frigates, corvettes, and gunboat flotilla ; whilst the mortar-boats anchored 2800 yards to the south of the fort. 1855] PROLOGUE, XXXV At 7 a.in. the fires were stoked up on board the floating batteries, and two hours later they moved in. At 9.30 they opened the bombardment, fighting twelve guns on the broad- side. The Russians had already fired upon them as they came in, but without the faintest effect. Mortar and gunboats in quick succession came into action, and last of all the line- of-battle ships joined in the attack. The floating batteries, however, were the decisive factors. At such a short range their projectiles were delivered with the most telling effect, and the Russian works seemed to crumble under the impact of their projectiles. On board them, in the armoured casemate, there was little light, as the thick smoke from the guns could not readily escape. The sight between decks was very weird, the men moving to and fro in this deep obscurity like shadows, whilst the steady clang of the enemy's shot upon the plating echoed like the blows of a cyclopean sledge-hammer. What casualties occurred were through shot and splinters entering by the port-holes. The D&vastation suffered most. One shot came through her centre port, took off the head of a gunner and struck a sergeant of marines in the stomach, embedding itself in the opposite side of the ship. One gunner had three sponges shattered in his hands without himself suffering hurt. The Russian shot and shell, mostly 32-pounder and i8-pounder, splashed all round the ship or struck her without producing the least effect. On the other hand, the Russian gunners at both barbette and casemate guns were much exposed. The forty marines on board each of the French batteries were armed with rifles and instructed to fire at the crews of the enemy's guns, which they did with great effect. The Russian guns were repeatedly hit by the projectiles of the floating batteries, and many were tossed off their carriages or broken. Against invulnerable enemies there was nothing to bt! done, and the Russian commander acted wisely in hoisting the white flag at 1.35 p.m., after three hours resistance. The Russians lost forty-five killed and 130 wounded, the allies two killed and twenty-five wounded, all on hoard thr floating xxxvi PROLOGUE. [1855 batteries. The Devastation had been hit thirty-one times on her side and forty-four times on her deck. In no case was there more than a dent, from one to one-and-a-half inches deep. For all practical purpose she was in as good condition when she came out of battle as when she entered it. The Lave had sixty hits ; the Tonnante about the same number. In the Russian fort of sixty-two guns and mortars, twenty-nine were dismounted. " Everything may be expected from these formidable engines of war," wrote Admiral Bruat in his official report. The English officers, from Admiral Lyons downwards, were astonished at their success, and perhaps not less the prophets who had foretold all manner of disasters. Though the wooden ships lost not a man, this was due, not to their inherent superiority to the armoured batteries, as some bold man argued in after years, but to the fact that the batteries engrossed the whole attention of the Russians. No captain of a wooden ship, after Sinope and the failure of September 17th, 1854, before Sebastopol, would have dared to take his ship in so close to the enemy's guns, or, if he had done, would have failed to pay very dearly for his act. On the 17th of September, the loss of life on the English squadron was forty-four killed and 266 wounded, or twenty-nine per 1000 of men engaged.* On this occasion it was not three per 1000. No doubt the Kinburn works were smaller and weaker than those at Sebas- topol, but still the immense value of armour would seem evident. Yet not for another four years did England realise the truth, whereas France set to work at once to reconstruct her fleet. The danger of such delay is seen in the fact that in 1 86 1, England was weaker at sea than her more enterprising and inventive rival. * Two English and six French ships were very badly damaged and had to be repaired. The French lost in men thirty killed and 164 wounded. IRONCLADS IN ACTION. CHAPTER I. The AfoxiTOR and the Merrimac. 1 86 1 to 1862. It was the second vear of the American Civil War, the struggle between the Northern, or Federal party, and the Southern, or Confederate, the one striving to maintain the Union, the other to uphold slavery and the right of the States composing the Union to complete internal autonomy. The war was one in which, from the political and physical condi- tions then obtaining, sea power was bound to play an enormous part, and whichever of the two combatants could secure the grasp of the sea was bound to be victorious. Pen'eiving this both sides turned their attention to the creation of a navv. The Southern States, devoid of manu- factures and engineering works, with no shipwrights and scarcely a single navy yard, were in no verj' favourable position for the development of such a force. The capture of Norfolk, Virginia, however, gave them a dock and some wooden hulls upon which to go to work. Moreover a vast quantity of ordnance had fallen into their hands at this same place, and, included in the 1 198 cannon, which they found there, were fifly-two Dahlgrens, heavy smooth-bores of a type then considered admirable.* The dearth of iron and the paucity of iron foundries made such an acquisition peculiarly * All the D.ihl{(rens captured were of 9.inrh calibre. Besides these, one ii-inch columbiad (or shell.gun), two 10-inch, and seventy-nine 8-inch guns fell into the hands of the Southerners, making a total of 134 heavj guns. B 2 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1861 valuable to them ; indeed, it is not too much to say that it was mainly with these weapons that in the earlier days of the war their ships and forts were equipped. If the South lacked the implements with which to fight, it was not much better off in respect of trained men to handle them when improvised. There were officers in plenty, but there were no seamen, a fact which must not be forgotten when we come to the per- formances of their ships in battle. At the same time the officers were both able and zealous ; full of professional know- ledge, and not averse to innovations in naval science. The warships of the United States which had, with the exception of the vessels scuttled at Norfolk, remained in the hands of the Northern Government, were, one and all, built of wood, and of the old pattern. The grand total reached seventy-six vessels, mounting 1783 guns, and displacing 105,000 tons ; but of these no less than thirty -two relied upon sails alone for their motive power. They were obsolete, even before the introduction of armour, as steam was already an indispensable requisite for the warship. Some of the others were fine and powerful ships, but very few indeed were adapted for operations in the shallow waters of the Southern States. For the neglect of the navy, which had left the Central Government unable promptly to equip a formidable squadron, the North had to pay very dearly. Few of the Southern ports were protected by defences which could have withstood the attack of a moderate naval force in 1861; but, as months passed without such attacks being delivered, the works at Charleston, at Wilmington, and at Mobile grew ever stronger, till they were capable of holding out against anything but a vigorous and combined assault by sea and land. A strong navy would have suppressed the Secession at its inception.* For the South to endeavour to compete with the North in ships of the ordinary type was hopeless. The only chance lay in designing vessels of extreme power, which could be manned by small crews, and which could afford their crews • " Battles and Leaders," i., 615. liW)!] THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC. 3 grt-at protection. ** Inequality of numbers may be compensated by invulnerability. Not only does economy, but naval success, dictate the wisdom and expediency of fighting with iron against wood, without regard to first cost/' wrote Mr. Mallory, StHTttary of the Confederate States' Navy. He further pointed out that an iron-armoured ship could cope with countless wooden frigates, whereas, if the South built wooden ships, they must fall victims to the more numerous vessels of their type which the North possessed. A new and formidable typt* must be created. These words were written in May, iSf)i, and reveal great tactical insight. Not that there was anything new in the idea of armour, though its application to ships, howfver admirable in theory, had not as yet been severely tested in war. At Kinburn armoured floating battt-rics had indeed figured, but opinion was divided as to their success. .\gam. in both England and France ironclads were undt-r construction, or actually constructed, whilst a .Mr. Stevens, as far back as the forties had commenced an armoured floating battery in the United States. But in the United States, a community at once inventive and disposed to welcome departures from the existing designs, the South had the credit of being the first to adopt armour. The North had at least a dozen ships which might have been protected in the same manner as iheMerrimac.hxxi for months nothing was done, it was Stevens* ironclad vessel which the Southern designers had in mind when they constructed the Aferrimacf^ Having no ad(*quate engineering shops, and. as has been said, very M'anty ship-building resources, they were driven to use the hull and engini-s of the United States' .ship of that name. The Mtrrimac had been a 40-gun frigate of 3500 tons, and her remarkable size and novel artillery had attracted great atten- tion in England on a visit which she paid during the year i856.t * She wa% rr.n.iincd th« Virginia^ but the older title is used as the better known. t The followin|( in a description of the old Merrimac : " The Merrimmc '\% considered as an experimental ship .... The length at the load water line is 257 feet ; her extreme breadth, 57 feet 4 inches ; and her draught of water, B 2 4 IRONCLADS IN ACTION, [1861 At the commencement of the war she was lying off the Norfolk Navy Yard with several other ships, wanting crews, when, as the place was threatened by the Confederates, the United States' officer in charge decided to burn the stores and destroy the ships, which be thought himself unable to remove. She was in consequence set on fire, but sank, apparently before much damage had been done to her, and when the Con- federates, a few days later, occupied the town, they made preparations to raise her. Her machinery, when she was recovered, was found to be capable of rapid repair, whilst her hull was still sound. Having no shipwrights, the Southerners found here the material on which to base their designs. A rough design was prepared on the model of Stevens' old ironclad by Commander Brooke. The entire upper works of the vessel were removed, where they had not been destroyed by fire, and she was cut down to the water line. Upon the hull was built amidships, a rectangular casemate, 170 feet long. The sides of this casemate were formed of 20 inches of pine, with 4 inches of oak upon it, inclined at an angle of thirty-five degrees. Outside this great thickness of timber two layers of iron plating,* each 2 inches thick, were fixed. This armour had been rolled from rails in the one foundry which Richmond possessed ; the plates were 8 inches broad,. and the inner course was laid horizontally, the outer 24 feet. The heights of the gun-deck ports above the water line are 9 feet forward and 12 feet aft. Her ports are 3 feet 8 inches long, and 8 feet 6 inches asunder. Her burden is 3197 tons. The ship is pierced for sixty guns, but at present carries only forty. On her upper deck she has two lo-inch pivot-guns of a new pattern, each weighing 107-cwt., and fourteen 8-inch shell guns — old pattern. On her main deck are twenty-four 9-inch g^ns of 83-cwt Her greatest speed is said to have been seven knots an hour, and this was under favourable circumstances." — Sir H. Douglas, " Naval Gunnery," p. 279. She was built at Charleston in 1855. • There are considerable discrepancies in the various accour^ts of her. The slope of her casemate is variously given as thirty-five and forty-five degrees ; the thickness of her armour as 4J and 4 inches. The illustrations in •* Battle> and Leaders " differ a little — one making her armour project below the water- line, another representing it as flush with the side. iSf.ij THE MONITOR AND THE M ERR! MAC. 5 vertically, whilst the two courses were secured to the timber backing by bolts of if inches thick, which, running right through, were clinched en the inside. The roof of the case- mate was formed by a grating which was 20 feet wide and 160 feet long. There were no masts, and but one funnel, which was not protected in any way. At the for\vard end of the casemate was situated the pilot house, a slight conical projection rising 3 feet above the deck, with 4 inches of armour upon it. The iron plating on the casemate sloped down some 2 fet't under water, and projected slightly from the hull. The ship had unarmoured ends of considerable length, I 10 fret, out of a total length of 280 feet, being destitute of plating. Her stern was left very nearly flush with the water, but forward a light false bow of timber was built up to prevent the water banking upon the casemate. To the stem vvas tilted a cast-iron ram which projected 4 feet. The casemate, which was rounded at each end, was pierced with fourteen ports, the sills of which were 5 feet above the water-line. In thf battery were ten guns; forward and aft two 7-inch rifled wt-apons mounted on pivots, so that they could be trained in the keel-line or on either beam ; on each broadside one 6-inch rifled gun strengthened by steel bands shrunk upon the breech, and three 9-inch smooth-bore Dahlgren guns, which had come from the store of weapons taken at the capture of the Norfolk Yard. The workmanship of the vessel was rough, but she was none the less a formidable craft, and was, in the absence of masts and rigging, and in her low freeboard fore and aft, a most daring departure from the i^ccepled designs of ship builders. Above water she was invulnerable to all but the heaviest ordnance. The credit for the design belongs equally to Commander Brooke, who conceived the general idea, and Constructor Porter, who carried it out in detail. The diflficulties to be faced were very great, for from lack of iron and suitable plant for rolling plates in the South thcTe was t onsiderable delay in obtaining the armour from the Richmond 6 IRONCLADS IN ACTION, [i 86 1-2 works. Though she was begun in the summer of 1861 it was not till the commencement of March, 1862, that she was ready for sea. She was then manned with a crew of 300 men, who were picked from the Confederate army, in the absence of trained sailors, and were placed under the command of the able and energetic Captain Buchanan, a seceder from the United States' Navy. Her second officer was Lieutenant Jones, also trained in the United States' Navy. Meantime in the North the need for armour-plated ships in naval warfare was acknowledged, though the Navy Board there showed far less discernment than the Southern Secretary. In August, three months after Mr. Mallory decided upon armour, an advertisement was issued at Washington, inviting designs for ironclad warships, and towards the end of that month Captain Ericsson, the great inventor, addressed a letter to President Lincoln, drawing his attention to an invulnerable ship, which he had projected. In September, by the most earnest and determined efforts, Ericsson succeeded in per- suading the board to construct one vessel after his design."*^ • Ericsson's letter to Navy Board. Sept. 3rd, 1861. "In laying before you the accompanying plans and specifications of an impregnable battery, I feel called upon to make the following remarks: " The wrought-iron ordnance of 12 inches calibre, planned by the writer already in 1840, practically established the fact that iron plates of 4^ inches thickness could not resist projectiles from such heavy guns. Previous to the experiments at Sandy Hook, which you will remember were made in 1841 with the ordnance alluded to, I had determined theoretically that 6 inches thickness would be re- quired to protect ships against the same, and that iron plates without wooden support, unless made thicker, could not withstand continued firing. Accordingly the revolving turret of my proposed battery is made 8 inches thick, in addition to which the outward curvature of the turret will on dynamic considerations materially assist the resisting capability of the iron. Apart from the great strength of the turret, it should be borne in mind that but few balls will strike so accurately in the centre of the turret as not to glance off by angular contact. The United States may justly claim to have been far ahead of the naval powers of Europe, who have just found out what we demonstrated twenty years ago. *' In respect to the impregnable nature of the battery proposed, I need not enter on a demonstration before one so experienced as yourself. It will be all- sufficient merely to ask you to look carefully at the plan. It will, however, be i86i] THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC. ^ She was to be built entirely at his risk, since, if unsuccessful, she was not by the terms of the contract to be accepted, and all the money paid on account was to be refunded. She was to be completed in the unprecedentedly short time of one hundred days, for already the progress of the Merrimac was creating panic in the North. Immediately the contract was awarded, and before it was even signed, the keel plate of the vessel had been ordered by Ericsson, and had passed through the rollers of the mill. The ship which was to be built, and which has since become so famous under the name Monitor^ was even a more radical departure from the accepted designs of warships than the Merrimac, The following conditions logically dictated her plan. In the first place she was to be invulnerable, and this could only be secured by a great thickness of armour. In the second place her draught had necessarily to be light, as she would have to operate in the shoal water, which fringes the coast of the Southern States. In the third place she had to be quickly built, if she was to meet the Merrimac before the Confederate ship did any damage. It followed then that she must be small, and being small she could carr)' no ver)^ extensive batter)*. Hence the problem was to produce a ship which should carry few guns and yet possess an all-round lire. The manner in which Ericsson solved this problem shows his great genius as an engineer. He decided to employ the turret to contain and shelter the guns. Thus an extremely small armoured structure would give perfect protection ; the plating could be concentrated upon it instead of being distributed along a huge casemate ; and as the turret revolved, the guns could cover a wide angle. proper for me to advert to the fart that the ironclad vessels of France and KngUnd are utterly unable to resist elongated shot fired from the I2.inch f^ns of the battery. The 4|.inch plates of La Gloire or the Warrior would crumple like brown paper under the fon-e of such projectiles, and at close quarters every *hot would crush in the enemy's sides at the water-line. The opposing broad- sides would be nothing more than the rattling of pebbles upon our cylindrical iron turret " — Church. " Ericsson," i., 274-5. 8 IRONCLADS IN ACTION, [1854-60 The idea was no new one. Speaking of it himself the inventor states : '* A house or turret turning on a pivot for protecting apparatus intended to throw warlike projectiles is an ancient device ; I believe it was known among the Greeks. Thinking back I cannot fix any period of my life at which I did not know of its existence."* An inventor named Timby indeed had at this very period proposed a land battery, which consisted of a circular armoured structure, revolving upon a pivot, having several floors, and upon each a number of guns on slides ; as the turret revolved the guns could be succes- sively discharged at the target. This crude idea was, how- ever, very different from Ericsson's finished structure, and cannot even claim to anticipate it, since Ericsson had some eight years before submitted a very similar design to the Emperor Napoleon, then at war with Russia. The Emperor examined it and returned it with a polite note, urging that the main objection to the vessel was the small number of guns which it could bring into action. Very shortly before the date on which he received Ericsson's design, he had embarked upon the construction of the five armoured batteries, which he employed in the Crimea. In England Captain Coles had independently evolved the turret, and brought his designs before the United Service Institution in i86o,t though the form of turret which he pro- posed differed in many important respects from Ericsson's. But it was as yet only speculative, and only Denmark up to this date had had the courage to abandon the broadside system and adopt this novel protection for the warship's artillery. The credit of the innovation belongs almost entirely then to the United States' naval authorities, who had the good sense to see that there was a great deal in Ericsson's idea, and this though they still saddled him with the blame of the bursting of a novel 12-inch gun, and though * Church's '* Life of Ericsson," ii., 114. t Journal United Service Institution, iv., 280 fF. i86i-2l THE MONITOR AND THE M ERR I MAC, 9 his ** Caloric ship " had been a practical failure, if a theoretic success. They did not, however, pin their entire faith upon the Afonitor, but also gave orders for the construction of a broadside ship, the Ironsides, which was generally similar in design to the AferrimaCy but with this important difference that she had 4 J -inch solid-rolled armour plate instead of two thicknesses of iron as the Southern ship. A third ship commenced was the Galena, which had bars of iron for her armour, and proved a complete failure. The keel of the Monitor was laid October 25th, 1861, and she was launched January 30th, 1862, being completed for sea February I5lh, and turned over to the Government four days later, or only 1 18 days from her commencement, a feat which at that date must be reckoned as extraordinary, though during the Crimean War the floating battery Thunderbolt had been built in Kngland in three months. The Monitor was from turret to keel the product of Ericsson's brain, and was crammed with inventions of his own, which were created on the spur of the moment, but yet worked well in practice. She was a vessel of 776 tons old measurement, modern displace- ment 1000 tons; her extreme length was 172 feet; her breadth 41 J feet; and her draught of water only \o\ feet. One of the most noticeable features about her was the over- hang of her sides, which projected some distance from her lower hull, so that viewed from below she presented the appearance of a ship-bottom fixed to a raft. Frequent com- plaints were made of the action of this overhang in a heavy sea. since when she came down heavily, it seemed as if the lower part of the hull would be torn away from the upper, so violently did the flat under surface of the overhang catch the water. Yet it does not appear that these complaints had any substantial foundation ; they were due to the fact that the officers commanding the monitors were new to their craft, and did not thoroughly understand them or their behaviour. The light draught and the absolute necessity of protecting the hull drove Ericsson to submerge it almost entirely, so that 10 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1861 when in trim for battle only 2 feet of the overhang emerged, and as this was plated with five i-inch layers of iron it could not be seriously damaged by shot. The deck was protected by two i-inch iron plates ; the anchor and propeller were sheltered by the overhang which extended about 14 feet forward beyond the hull, and 32 feet aft. The anchor could be lowered, hanging as it did in a well forward, without a single man being exposed, and the Confederates were greatly puzzled to see the monitors steam up and moor themselves automatically, nor could they understand how it was done. In this system there was one great disadvantage ; the anchor- well fatally weakened the bow, incapacitating it for ramming. The turret stood very nearly in the centre of the ship ; it was 20 feet in diameter inside and 9 feet high, revolving on a central pivot which was supported upon the ship's bottom. It was protected by eight layers of i-inch plate, and the roof was ot rolled iron, with gratings to admit air, and sliding hatches. The guns in the turret were two 11 -inch Dahlgren smooth-bores, firing projectiles of 135 to 166 lbs. weight with 15 lbs. of powder.* The vessel could, if necessary, have carried heavier weapons, but, as there were none in store, it was decided to employ the lighter guns which were ready to hand. Solid iron port-stoppers, hanging from the roof like pendulums, closed the portholes when the guns were run in. There were five projections from the deck, in addition to the turret. Forward in the centre line was the pilot-house, or conning-tower, projecting 4 feet, and formed of 9-inch logs of iron bolted through the corner. On the top was a flat 2-inch plate, which was left loose, so that it could be raised, if it was necessary to leave the ship. The pilot-house was square in shape and would hold three men with difficulty ; the wheel was secured to one of the logs in front; and the sight- holes were five-eighths of an inch wider, affording a vertical view 80 feet high, at a distance of 200 yards. If Ericsson had * For various details of U.S.N, smooth-bores, see Table I. '1h\ F^ i86i] THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC. ii been given sufficient time he would have placed the pilot- house on the top of the turret, as in the later vessels of this class, but he found it impossible to introduce this feature, with its many complications, within the limit of days fixed by the Government. The other projections from the deck were the two small square smoke-stacks rising 6 feet above it, and removing for battle, and the two blower-holes 4^ feet above deck. The ventilation was entirely artificial — another striking innovation — air being forced into the ship and escaping through the turret, a system which had the merit of quickly removing smoke from it, but rendered the atmosphere in it unbearably dost* and offensive — charged as the draught was with all the gases of the boiler and engine-room. This strange craft had many unfavourable critics. Even the chief of the Docks' Bureau,* Commodore Smith, seems to have had some apprehensions that she would prove a failure, though he was really responsible for the order. First of all, he was afraid that: *' The concussion in the turret will be so great that men cannot remain in it and work the guns, after a few fires with shot." Ericsson reassured him upon this point from his own experience in Sweden, where he had seen heavy guns fired from small huts. A few days later the commodore writes : ** I understand that computations have been made by expert naval architects of the displacement of your vessel, and thf result arrived at is that she will not float with the load you propose to put upon her, and, if she could, sht- could not stand upright for want of stability, nor attain a speed of four knots. ... I have had some misgiving as to her stability as well as sea- worthiness, on account of the abrupt termination of iron to the wooden vessel. I have thought the angle " (which the overhang made with the hull) •* should bi- filled up with wood, to ease the motion of the vessel in • He rrprrscnted the Navy Department, supen-isinjj the construction of the Monitor. 12 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1861 rolling." He then reminds Ericsson that he is personally responsible for the ship, and had better make some changes to ensure her floating. The engineer reassured him, only to be next told: ''A heavy sea one side of the battery will rise out of the water or the sea recede from it, and the wooden vessel underneath will strike the water with such force, wh^ it comes down or rolls back, as to knock the people on board oflF their feet.'* The timorous gentleman returned to the attack a few days later with the comforting assurance, ** The more I reflect upon your battery the more 1 am fearful of her efficiency." He dreaded now asphyxia for the crew : " Your plan of ventilation appears plausible, but sailors do not fancy living under water without breathing in sunshine occasionally. I propose a temporary house be con- structed on deck, which will not increase the weight of the vessel more than eight or ten tons." The Press, too, attacked the vessel, styling it ** Ericsson's Folly," and blamed the engineer for wasting the resources of the country in such straits. Admiral Porter was one of the very few who recog- nised the real value of the ship. **This is the strongest fighting vessel in the world," he wrote, " and can whip any- thing afloat." Amidst a chorus of criticism the vessel was launched. On her trial trip neither steering gear nor engines worked properly, and, owing to the carelessness of an engineer, both gun-carriages were disabled temporarily. The rudder, which was of the balanced type, was found to have been misplaced through the error of a draughtsman, and the Navy Department wished to have a new one after their own heart fitted. Ericsson, however, refused to allow this alteration, which would have required a month's delay, and in less than three days put the steering-gear right. " The Monitor is MINE," he wrote, '* and no change shall be made." He had designed the ship and all its parts — hull, turret, gun-carriages, engines and anchor-hoisting machinery, and put into it no less than forty patentable contrivances. No wonder he called it his. i86ij THE MOSITOR AND THE MERRIMAC, 13 The contract price of the ship was 275,000 dollars, to bt* paid in six instalments. The actual cost was 195,000 dollars. thus leaving a substantial profit. The turret was built at the Novelty Ironworks, and the hull at Rowland's Works. The Government was behindhand in all its payments, and when made they did not always represent the face value, so that the engineer was considerably embarrassed, and the cqjistruc- tion of the vessel delayed. Indeed, a week after her engage- ment with the Merrimac had proved her sterling qualities as a fighting ship, 68,750 dollars were still owing. The timi- assigned by the contract for the completion of the vessel had been exceeded, owing to the slackness of the Navy Depart- ment, and Plricsson had ver\' considerable difficulty in obtaining the payment of this balance. This, then, was the situation during the winter of 1861- 1862. Both sides were racing to complete their respective ironclads. The Northerners knew of the building of the Merrimac ; they knew, too, that if the South obtained, even temporarily, the command of the sea, the game was up. The race was for no light stakes, but for the maintenance of the l.'nion. The breathless anxiety of those days has passed into history, and has been forgotten : but, looking back after the lapse of more than thirty years, there should be no one ot English race who does not rejoice that the North was not beaten in the competition, and that the great Republic. avoiding disruption, came safely through the stormy sea of war. Ericsson's untiring efforts for his adopted country were rewarded by even the approval of his censor, who wrote to him. januar)' 29th, as follows : " The Merrimac is out of dock, and ready for her trial trip. 1 think the wrought iron shot of the Ericsson battery will smash in her 2j-inch plates, provided she can get near enough to her, while the 9-inch shot and shells of the Merrimac will not upset your turret. Let us have the test as soon as possible, for that ship will be a troublesome customer to our vessels in Hampton Roads." The name of 14 IRONCLADS IN ACTION, [1861 Monitor was given to the Northern vessel, at Ericsson's sug- gestion, that it might suggest doubts to the English Admiralty as to their wisdom in lavishing hundreds of thousands upon ironclad frigates, and that it might admonish the rebel leaders of the folly of imagining that they could bar their coasts to the United States' fleet. The ship, having been turned over to the Government, was commissioned by Lieutenant Worden with Lieutenant Greene as second in command, and Engineer Newton in charge of her machinery. She was manned by a picked crew of volunteers, since service on board her was regarded much as a forlorn hope. At first intended for the Gulf of Mexico, she was now ordered to steam for Hampton Roads, and left New York for that destination on the 6th March, under convoy of two steamers. She had scarcely left when fresh orders came to change her destination to Washington, but fortunately they came too late. The senior naval officer at Hampton Roads had been notified of this change, but upon the ship's arrival ventured to disobey, with the happiest results for the United States. On Saturday, the 8th of March a formidable Federal squadron lay at anchor in Hampton Roads. Under the Newport News batteries were the two warships Cumberland and Congress ; lower down, between Newport News and Fort Monroe, the Minnesota^ a steam frigate, with her sister ship the Roanoke ; and still lower, the St. Lawrence^ a sailing frigate. All were of wood, all were unarmoured, and all were shortly to be proved obsolete. The Minnesota and Roanoke were of 4500 tons displacement, and had been identical in construction with the Merrimac as she was before her conversion.* The morning was a splendid one, clear and warm. There was no sign of impending evil ; the Northern officers in consequence of a purposely inserted article in a Richmond paper were already beginning to disbelieve in the fighting • The 5"^. Lawrence carried fifty guns ; the Cumberland^ thirty ; and the Congress, fifty. All three were sailing vessels. The Minnesota and Roanoke^ each of forty-six g^ns, were steamers. 1 862] THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC. 15 qualities of the Merrimac ; and the ships lay with clothes drj'ing in the rigging and boats at the booms. All were hoping to be speedily relieved of the weary tedium of the blockade. One bell had struck some little time when the quarter-master of the Congress observed smoke rising from the woods which fringed the Norfolk estuary. After watching it for some moments he turned to the officer on deck and said ** I believe that thing is coming down at last, sir.'* That morning the Merrimac had put out from Norfolk on her trial trip. Her officers and men had received Communion for to them also it seemed that they were going on a desperate errand. The crew were untrained : the engines were hopelessly defective, and could not be relied on for more than six hours at a stretch, whilst at their best they could only just move the vessel along; the steering gear was unprotected and very inadequate, so that it took the ship thirty-five minutes to turn ; not one of her guns had ever been fired ; and to the last minute a crowd of artificers and mechanics were at work on board getting her ready. The ship itself was an entire innovation, and Captain Buchanan was out of health. Small wonder then that there was little confidence in the crew, though the Southerners generally had high hopes of her, and wailed anxiously to hear of her achievements. She was attended by a cheering crowd upon steamers, and by the small gunboats Yorktown* Jamestown^ Beaufort^ Raleigh, and Teaser^ mounting between them seventeen guns. .♦\s she reached Sewell's Point she was cheered by the Con- f«*c|i*rat<* gunners in the batteries there, and, turning westward, chose the southern of the two channels, which would bring her to the Cumberland, The Northern ships beat to quarters and prefjared for action, sending the Zouave, a small gunboat, to H'connoitre. This little vessel attacked "the roof of a barn with a huge chimney," by firing at it her 32-pounder rifled gun, but quickly found that she could do no damage whatever and • Also known as the Patrick Henry. i6 THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC, [1862 retired. The Merrimac took no notice, but went steadily on. Soon after one o'clock she was fired upon by the Cumberland^ and shortly after by the Congress and the shore batteries. The projectiles, however, did her no harm, and the Unionist officers were petrified with astonishment when they saw them glance off her armoured hull like so many peas. More than an hour passed before this fire was returned. At last the bow port-shutter on the ironclad was raised, and the Cumberland^ s men saw the 7-inch rifled gun protrude. There came a flash, and the violent explosion of a shell killed or wounded most of the crew of the Cumberland s after pivot- gun. The Merrimac then passed the Congress at a distance of two hundred yards, giving and receiving a broadside. On the Congress the slaughter was horrible. Few were wounded, as the shells killed most of the men outright. *' Our clean and handsome deck,'* says one of her officers, *' was in an instant changed into a slaughter-pen, with lopped-off legs and arms, and bleeding, blackened bodies scattered about by the shells, while blood and brains actually dripped from the beams." The quarter-master, who had discovered her approach, had both his legs taken off, and died in a few minutes, entreating the crew to stand firm till the last. As their terrible opponent passed up stream to assail the Cum- berland^ the men of the Congress^ believing that she was retreating, raised a tremendous cheer. But they were yet to suffer even more cruelly. Leaving the Congress on her starboard quarter, the Merrimac now headed straight for the Cumberland. Buchanan was resolved to use the ram for the first time in modern history, and before him the great sailing ship lay helpless. On he came, whilst the sloop poured in her poor, ineffectual fire, her men being determined to fight to the death. At last his iron ram struck the Cumberland in the starboard fore-channels, and the shock sent the ship heeling over, though it was scarcely felt on board the Merrimac, which reversed her engines as she dealt the i86i] THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC. 17 blow.* Then, backing out, but with the loss of her ill- attached ram, she left a huge gap in the Northern vessel's side, and, after discharging her bow-chaser, demanded the surrender of the doomed ship. It was then that Lieutenant Morris answered, '* Never ! I'll sink alongside " ; and, fol- lowing this refusal, the slowly-settling Cumberland was cannonaded for more than half an hour by the Southern flotilla. Yet there was still no word of surrender, and, with the dauntless heroism of their race, the American sailors fought steadfastly to the end, ever firing upon the impregnable hull which assailed them, their own decks strewn with dead and dying, the water constantly mount- ing, the red flag of '* no quarter " flying at their fore. This great deed of arms, this unflinching refusal to yield to defeat, may well recall the fiction of the Vengeur^ and Du Chailla's great words, ^'TireZy tirez toujours ; cest Ic dernier coup qui peut-vtre nous rendra victorieux'' But the Vengeurs men had to fight ships of their own class and kind, and here the Cumberland was faced by an opponent which she could scarcely hope to harm. It might have seemed wiser to surrender. The loss of many lives might have been thereby averted, and yet it is well to remember that these lives were not given in vain. There is an in- heritance of heroic example which is necessary to a nation's life ; death and defeat, if they are confronted with greatness of soul, raise the spirit of a people. The Northerners were facing the South in a life and death struggle ; they were yet to suffer many defeats, there were yet to be times when victory seemed hopeless. But the thought that these brave men had so nobly met their end, not bowing to calamity but confronting it unappalled, fired the Navy and raised the temper of the nation. National character is a more sacred thing than even human life. So, when the Cumberland's last gun was fired, half buried in the water, the people * This happened shortly before 2.50 p.m. i8 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1862 of the United States might know that no odds, however great, would overcome the tenacity of their sailors, if led by men who kn-ew how to inspire them ; and the people of the Confederacy might well have felt that the victory could never be theirs. Moreover it is on record that the fire poured in upon the Merri'maCj though seemingly at the time so resultless, considerably weakened the ironclad for her encounter with the Monitor, She now, with a slight leak forward caused by her ramming, turned upon the Congress^ which was to rival the Cumberland in her resistance. The Congress was com- manded by a son of that Commodore Smith of whom mention • has been made above ; he was a man of a determination and spirit that would not brook surrender. When his father, on that Black Sunday at Washington, was told that the Congress had surrendered, his first words were " Then Joe's dead. He'll never surrender his ship." It was so ; the young man died early in the action, struck in the chest by a shell fragment. The Congress^ on seeing the fate of the Cumberland^ had set her topsails and jib, and, assisted by the Zouave y had made for the shoal water off Newport News. Here she ran aground, but if she was unable to move, her opponent could not approach her closely enough to ram. The Merrimac came as near as she could, and, at a distance of 150 yards, occupied a position whence she could rake the Northern ship with her entire broadside, whilst the Congress could only bring two guns to bear. Worst of all, the Minnesota^ Roanoke^ and St, Lawrence^ which were coming up to her assistance, had also grounded, a circumstance which perhaps saved them from destruction. And now the bloody work recommenced. The shells of the ironclad swept the Congress^ quickly disabling her stern chasers and searching the ship. Just before the last of the stern guns was rendered useless, the powder ran short, and, finding none was sent up, the officer in charge went* to i862] THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC. 19 discover the reason. " After my eyes had become a little accustomed to the darkness/* he writes, "and the sharp smoke from burning oak, I saw that the line of cooks and wardroom servants stationed to pass full boxes had been raked by a shell, and every one of them either killed or wounded." The decks had to be constantly sluiced with water to prevent fire, even in the cockpit, and the icy coldness of the water added another to the terrible sufferings of the wounded who were lying there. The bulkheads had been knocked away to allow passage for the hoses, and the scene inside the ship was one of indescribable confusion. For an hour the Congress endured the fire of the Merrimac and the four gunboats* ; the ship was now on fire in more than one place ; the crew, or such of them as remained, could not be kept busy at the guns, for no guns bore ; there was nothing left but surrender. Accordingly the flag was lowered. At once officers came on board from the Merrimac and the gunboats, and ordered the crew of the beaten ship to withdraw that she might be fired. The shore batteries, however, had noticed the near approach of the Confederate vessels without guessing the explanation, and instantly poured in upon them a furious fire of cannon and musketry, wounding Buchanan and several Confederate officers. On this they drew off to a distance and resumed their fire upon the Congress^ which was now well alight, whilst her crew made the best of their way to the shore. The Merrimac had settled two of the Northern fleet ; seeing the Congress on fire, she turned to the Minnesota, which was the next ship, and lay hard and fast aground. Kut two hours of daylight remained ; the tide was ebbing strongly ; and the ironclad, finding that she could not venture in the northern channel, which would have brought her close to her enemy, had to take the southern one, when nearly a mile parted the opponents. The gunboats, however, went • Y^wktcmn, Beaufort^ Raleigh, and Jamestown. The Teaser was exchanging »hcu with the batteries on land. C 2 20 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1862 nearer, choosing a position for their attack, in which the Minnesota could only bring one heavy gun to bear ; but, supported by her smaller consorts, she drove them off, without any serious damage after an hour's fighting. The St, Lawrence, which had succeeded in getting off the shoals, was now seen approaching, and had indeed exchanged shots with the MerrimaCy when the latter, in the falling twilight, at last withdrew. As her pilot could not have answered longer for her safety, and as she was the sole hope of the South, it was deemed unwise to risk her loss. She could easily complete her work on the morrow. All through the night the waters of Hampton Roads were illuminated by the burning Congress, The magazine exploded soon after two o'clock, but this did not end the conflagration, and the hull was still blazing when the sun rose. In the day's fighting the Northerners had lost 250 killed or drowned, and probably an even larger number of wounded. Two ships had been destroyed. On the other side the Merrimac had started a slight leak ; every projection outside her armour had been shot away; but her armour had kept out every projectile, and only two men were killed and eight wounded. Thirteen men had been killed or wounded upon the gun- boats. The effect of this terrible defeat upon the North was stunning. In a moment their splendid frigates had been proved useless ; there was nothing between the ironclad and New York but the little Monitor , now some days at sea. On the Sunday after the battle, a Cabinet meeting was convened by Lincoln, speaking at which Mr. Stanton gave expression to the general feeling of dismay : '* The Merrimac will change the whole course of the war ; she will destroy seriatim every naval vessel ; she will lay all the cities on the seaboard under contribution. I shall immediately recall Burnside ; Port Royal must be abandoned. I will notify the governors and municipal authorities in the North to take instant measures to protect their harbours. I have no doubt that the enemy is i862] THE MONITOR AXD THE MERRIMAC, 21 at this minute on her way to Washington, and it is not unlikely that we shall have a shell or a cannon ball from one of her guns in the White House before we leave the room.*' IJncoln himself was much depressed, but did not share these extravagant apprehensions. It was proposed to sink the St. Lawrence across the channel of the Potomac, so as to obstruct it, and entanglements to catch the Merrimac's propeller were suggested. The South went wild with joy. At every station on his way to Richmond the bearer of the great news was sur- rounded by great crowds, who pressed about him, and insisted upon being told the stor\' of the fight. The hopes of the Confederates were as high as the despondency of the North was deep. Both sides instinctively recognised the supreme value at this critical moment of sea power. Yet it cannot be denied that the fears of the North have since been proved to have been excessive. The Merrimac was no sea-going ship : with her port-holes less than six feet above the water-line she could not have been fought in a sea- way ; her damaged engines, which in calm water could only just move the ship, could never have withstood the strains of a storm ; and her untrained crew must have handicapped her terribly in an encounter on open waters.* Moreover, the 5>outherners wanted her to guard the water approach to Richmond, and as she could not at one and the same time watch Hampton Roads and shell New York or Washington, the latter cities were safe. But had she, even for a few days, driven off the blockading squadron, stores and munitions might have been freely imported into the Southern States, and not improbably the war would have been greatly prolonged. * Vide Confederate Report in Churrh's " Ericsson/' vol. i.. 299-300. " Possibly we might hare taken the Virginia as far as Harrison's Bar, but such action woald hare been absurd from every point of view. As the enemy occupied both tides of the river above we could neither coal nor provision her, and would bave been compelled to destroy her if she remained so long uncaptured. . . . She was not weatherly enough to move in Hampton Roads at all times with safety.** 22 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1862 The Merrimac had everything in her favour when she assailed these wooden ships. The Cumberland was a sailing vessel unable to avoid the impact of the ram ; stationary, so that she inflicted no wrench upon her opponent's bow ; armed with guns which could not penetrate the Merrimac^ s armour. This battle, and the Austrian success at Lissa, led men to attach a singular value to the ram, which has been somewhat discounted in later years. Mr. Laird Clowes in a careful paper* has shown that of the many attempts at ramming, few have had any result ; to attack a vessel under steam in open water with the ram is an extremely difficult operation, and one which, if the speed on either side be at all high, would imperil the assailant very nearly as much as the assailed. If a near approach is made to a hostile ship, the danger of torpedoes has to be faced ; yet an inferior ship, with a determined captain might thus destroy a hostile vessel. Though artillery has developed greatly, and taken to its aid high explosives, it still remains doubtful whether its use alone would sink a well- constructed modern battleship. The ram does its work so quickly, the moral effect of the sudden loss of a ship is so overwhelming, that it might be wise to employ it even early in the engagement. The cruiser is here at a great disadvantage, since her bows are so weak that, in the words of a recent writer upon naval tactics, it would be dangerous for her to charge anything stouter than a jelly-fish.t Special vessels for ramming have been constructed both in England and America, but it cannot be said that they meet with the general approval of naval men. The question awaits a solution, which can only be given by a pitched battle fought between two powerful fleets. At nine o'clock on the night of the Merrimac* s first engage- ment a strange craft, which has been compared to " a cheese- box on a raft," steamed into Hampton Roads. She found the • Journal United Service Institution, 1894. See also ii., 159. j "Captain of a Battleship." Engineering, October 26th, 1894. i862] THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC. 23 Congress still burning fiercely, and heard the boom of her guns and the roar of the explosion of her magazines. The Monitor had had a terrible passage from New York. Manned by a crew who were strange to her, and who did not know their ship, this little vessel, intended solely for service in smooth water, and with a speed which did not exceed six knots, had faced the Atlantic. She was in tow of the Seth Low and convoyed by two gunboats. Her first day out was fine, but on the second day the wind freshened, and the sea rose, washing right over her low deck. The hatches leaked ; water poured down the funnels and blower holes, and streamed in through the hawse hole in the anchor-well, which, through oversight or ignorance, had not been made quite watertight. \ veritable waterfall descended under the turret ; instead of revolving upon a roller-way, its entire weight was supported and motion was imparted to it by a central spindle. When the ship was out of action, the lower edge of the turret rested upon a gun-metal ring let into the upper deck. In this position there would be no leakage, but the naval authorities had seen fit to key the turret up and pack oakum between its lower surface and this ring. The oakum was soon washed away, and the sea poured in through the extensive leak. Meantime the water, descending the funnel, had filled the engine room with deadly fumes, and driven out all the complement. Two engineers, who endeavoured to enter it that they might check the inrush of water, were taken out senseless ; the blower belts, which were likewise drenched, slipped, and all ventilation ceased; the fires fell rapidly, deprived of their draught, and soon there was not enough st<*am left to work the powerful pumps with which the ship was provided. Recourse was had to the hand- pumps, but they were not strong enough to force the water to the top of the turret, which was the only opening that could he used in bad weather. In consequence the buckets had to be passed from hand to hand, thus removing a minimum of watiT in a maximum of time. From the anchor well came 24 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1862 the most terrible and heart-rending screams and wails, and, as seamen are notoriously the most superstitious of mankind, this tended in no small degree to depress and discourage them. These screams, it seems, were caused by the compression of the air in the confined space, as the vessel pitched and rolled ; but, as this explanation was not then patent, resembling, as they did *' the death groans of twenty men," they may well have terrified the crew. The storm, however, abated towards evening and the crew were enabled to clear the ship of water ; but about midnight, with a rougher sea, their troubles recurred, and upon them all this further complication that the steering- gear broke down. By Saturday morning the Monitor was once more in smooth water, making good her defects ; and at four o'clock in the afternoon her crew heard a great way off the noise of heavy guns, which told them that there was fighting in Hampton Roads. Some time later they learned from the pilot, who met them, what had happened. Instantly preparations were made for action, the deck was cleared and the turret keyed up, though it was found that the machinery for revolving it had been rusted by the seawater and worked very badly. In spite of ever}' possible exertion, it was not till nine o'clock, or some time after the Merrimac^s withdrawal that Fort Monroe was reached. The crew were wearied by their desperate struggle with the elements, and worn out by confinement in a vessel, the ventilation of which had broken down, and where the only safe place was the turret top. Yet the Monitor had behaved very well ; she had proved herself a steady craft, and the serious leakage was not wholly her designer's fault. The crew had borne themselves like gallant men, and had shown that they were of excellent spirit. Lieutenant Worden saw Captain Marston of the Roanoke^ who had received orders to send the Monitorto Washington; these orders Marston wisely disobeyed, directing her to remain in the Roads, and sending on board a pilot, who took her up to the Minnesota^ where she anchored and waited for day. 1 862] THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC. 25 In the meanwhile, at Norfolk, the Merrimac was being overhauled. Her untrustworthy engines were botched ; the f»ap where her ram had been was covered with planking ; her steering gear was examined ; and about daybreak she started for Hampton Roads to complete her work. As day dawned she saw the '* tin can on a shingle '* that was destined to checkmate her endeavours. The depression in the Union forces was great. The crews of the ships, which lay in the Roads, had seen in a few hours two splendid ships destroyed without, apparently, the faintest harm to their enemy. They knew that their turn was to come next. The Minnesota was helpless on the shoals, and what could save her from the Congress^ fate, when the full tide enabled the Merrimac to approach ? Beside the Minnesota lay this outlandish, untried Monitor^ a vessel which the navy generally viewed with the utmost contempt, which had scarcely sur\'ived the perils of the sea, and could hardly be supposed able to confront the powerful ironclad Merrimac. The crew of the little ship were exhausted ; her engineer lay ill in his bunk ; the captain was worn out by the harassing struggle with the water. Seldom had a vessel such heavy odds against her. As he saw his opponent, Worden raised anchor and headed for the Merrimac. ITie Confederates had caught sight of her by the light of the burning Congress during the night. Lieutenant Jones com- manded in place of the wounded Buchanan ; he had fought as second in command in the action of the previous day, and was an able and energetic officer, who had had considerable experience in the old United States' Navy. He saw in the puny Northern ship his true antagonist, and realised that till she was destroved he could not have his wav with the Union unarmoured ships, or clear the road to Washington. A new obstacle was interposed, and this obstacle he must encounter and surmount. As the Merrimac came down like Goliath to conquer David, she exchanged fire with the Minnesota^ but a moment later 26 IRONCLADS IN ACTION, [1862 was assailed by the Monitor. In the pilot-house of the latter vessel was Lieutenant Worden with the quarter-master and pilot. In charge of the turret were Lieutenant Greene and Engineer Stimers with sixteen men handling the guns and the machinery for revolving the turret. The day was sunny and bright, and crowds of spectators of both sides covered the shores and watched eagerly to see the issue of the fighting : the Confederates, knowing that if they could destroy the Union squadron the sea-board was open to them ; the Federals realising that their only hope was in the Monitor. At 8.30 the Merrimac opened the battle, discharging her 7-inch rifled bow-chaser at the Monitor ; the target was very small, and she failed to score a hit. The Monitor^ s time was come ; she steamed close up to her great antagonist, and replied with her two 11 -inch lyolb. shot, fired point blank. The shot glanced off the sloping sides of the Merrimac quite harmlessly, which may be explained by the fact that the charge of powder was only I5lbs., whereas it was afterwards dis- covered that the Dahlgren i i-inch gun would safely fire double that weight, and further by the fact that Lieutenant Greene gave the guns a slight elevation, instead of depressing them so as to strike the sides of Merrimac at a right angle. As the Monitor discharged her two guns, the Merrimac brought her starboard battery to bear, and shot after shot struck the Monitor^s turret. The concussion was severe, but had no evil effects upon the men or the turret. Those who had predicted that everyone in the structure would be stunned or killed were seen to be entirely in the wrong. The confidence of the crew rose at once. No damage having been done on either side, the ships reloaded and closed again. The Monitor v^2ls firing solid shot, though of cast instead of wrought iron,* and in consequence * Wrought iron shot had been supplied, but in the hurry they had not been properly gauged, and therefore could not be used, from the danger of their jamming in the guns. The concussion of the Monitor s shot on the Merrimac^s sides made the latter's men bleed from the nose and ears. Iron 4 m. ^ pmk 4 in Pine fOin Sfem t C^ \ Bom Platb II. /. Casemate armour of Mernmac ZLatitudinal section of Monitor 3.Deck'plan of l^omtor A Turrmr Pilot Mouse C funnels 00 BlOmer holes C Propeller weU F Anchor Well 1 862] THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC. 27 they broke up on impact. The Merrimac on her part had rome out without solid shot, equipped simply with shell and grape for the destruction of the wooden ships; had she possessed solid projectiles for her 7-inch rifles she might have driven them through the Monitor^s turret. As it was, a vigorous, but resultless cannonade was exchanged, each ship firing as fast as she could, the Mont tor once every seven minutes, and the Merrimac every fifteen. On board the latter ship, however, the fire was slowed, when it was found that no effect was produced. Lieutenant Jones coming down from the deck, and finding a gun detachment standing at ease, asked why they were not firing. He was told that powder was precious, and after two hours continuous firing as much damage could be done by snapping the fingers as by dis- charging the guns. One immense advantage the Monitor possessed, she was superior in speed and manoeuvring power ; besides this her revolving turret enabled her to bring her guns to bear in all directions, whilst the ports in the Merrimac being ver)' small, the latter ship found some difficulty in laying her guns upon her opponent. In the Monitor's turret great difficulty was experienced in working the revolving engine. It was hard to start it, and still harder to stop it when started. Marks had been made upon the floor under the turret, to show the starboard and port side of the vessel; but, by the grime of the smoke, they were very quickly obliterated. A very scanty view could be obtained from the turret, as there were no sight- holes but the gun-ports. These were very small, and nearly closed by the guns when run out, whilst, when the guns werr run in. they were sealed by the port-stoppers. The Merrimac directed a steady musketr\' fire upon them when- ever they came into view, but, to prevent a shell entering, or striking and jamming the stoppers, the turret was always rt-volved after a dis<'harge till the ports were away from the enemy. Had the gun crews been killed or disabled there was no one to take th<*ir place, as there wrre only just 'A IRONCLADS IS ACTIOS. [i8fe »ttflficumi men on tx>ard to fight the ship. The speaking- \Ax\m Uj iiut pilot-house had been broken eariy in the engage- ment, and orders had to be passed along by word to the turret, one of the chain of men told off for this dut^' being a landftman who misunderstood and confused the technical term». The crew of the turret, ignorant of the direction in which their adversary lay — for in a revolving turret or bar- liettibly have seen or known of Ericsson's first design when he brought his cupola ship before the United Service Institution in i860. He had already, in 1854, constructed a domed turret which was fired on a raft, and carried one 68>pounder. His Royal Sovereign was the successor of the Rolf Keake, an iron double-turretcd monitor, with lowering bulwarks, which was ordered by the Danish Government in 1861. In 1864, she engaged the Prussian batteries at EckernsUnde, which mounted the 24-pounder rifled Krupp . and though hit 150 times was none the worse. The turret-ships Scorpion and Wivern, which were built in England for the Confederate Government, and seiied and purchased in 1864 by the British Government, were also on Coles' pattern. These three ships had solid 4j-inch plating on their turrets, and were a great improYement upon Ericsson's Monitor. The Huascar^ built for Peru in 1865, carried one of Coles' turrets, and is afloat to this day. D 34 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1862 by the projectile has risen from 1850 foot tons in the 7-inch rifle to 35,230 foot tons in the 68-ton gun, which is the standard heavy weapon of our fleet. Armour has, indeed, increased in thickness from 4 J inches to 18 inches and 20 inches of greatly improved quality, whilst latteriy the Harvey process has given an increase of fifty per cent, to its resisting power as compared with the wrought iron of 1862, thereby ensuring in a thickness of 9 inches, the protective power which required 14 inches at this epoch. But it is certain that the offence has developed more rapidly than the defence.* This battle following upon the lesson of the 8th so closely, emphasised yet more clearly the doom of the old line of battle ship. Where the Congress and Cumberland had failed so hopelessly, a vessel infinitely smaller, infinitely less imposing in appearance, had encountered their antagonist without any loss at all. It had been maintained by some that the greater number of guns carried upon the unarmoured vessel would compensate for the absence of protection. t On the contrary, it was now demonstrated that an impenetrable ship cannot be overcome by hurling a mass of projectiles against her side, to merely glance off it. It was not found practicable to silence either the Merrimac or Monitor by firing upon their port- holes. Some damage was done to the former ship by this method of attack, it is true ; but she never ceased to be battle- worthy. And the whole aim of naval tactics is to render an opponent's ship no longer serviceable for action. Till this has been done there is no victory. The subsequent fate of the two ships which took part in the battle deserves a word. After the engagement the • The thickest armour can still, it is true, defy the heavy gun. But a very small extent of surface can be protected by thick armour, and the rest of the ship's side is necessarily open to all shots. t By Sir Howard Douglas and Captain Fishbourne, vide for the latter's opinion, Journal United Service Institute, ii., 201 ff. The slow speed, the small number of guns carried by ironclads are his objections, and he also apprehends danger from splinters, and from shots entering through the port-holes of iron- clads. i862] THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC. 35 Merrimac refitted, and came out once more,* this time with solid steel shot, and with every preparation to board. She was now commanded by Captain Tatnall, who will ever be honoured by Englishmen, since he it was who, three years before, with the words ** Blood is thicker than water," had come to the aid of his kindred in the Peiho. The wooden ships were, however, under the shelter of the Federal bat- teries, and showed no inclination to risk an engagement. The Vanderhilt^ a fast merchant steamer, which had been fitted with a formidable ram expressly to destroy the MerrimaCy remained inactive by the side of the Monitor, The Southern ship had with her six gunboats, which were sent in to capture some barges lying near the Federal fleet. These were carried off and destroyed without bringing on an engagement. Seeing that the Monitor would not accept his challenge, Tatnall, for his part, did not care to go in under the batteries and attack her. The Merrimac was the only vessel of any power which the South possessed to protect the James River, and the water approach to Rich- mond. In the same way the Monitor was the only iron- clad to cover Washington and the Northern coast-line. Each commander had, therefore, to be very careful of his ship, and there was nothing to be gained by another doubtful battle. Tatnall had been refused permission to go below Fort Monroe by the Confederate government ; and, as all the wooden ships were moored below that fort, he could not make a dash upon them, disregarding the Monitor, A month later, the Merrimac was scuttled and abandoned by her crew. It was necessary for the Confederates to evacuate Norfolk, and the ironclad's draught of wat(?r would not allow her to ascend the James River. At the same time, her destruction was a great blow to the hopes of the Southerners, since those amongst them, who were not sailors, greatly over-estimated her offensive powers. • April nth, 1862. I) 2 30 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1862 It was an equal relief to the Northerners, who were thus rrliovt'd of a dangerous and unsubdued antagonist. The Monitor did not long survive her enemy. Most unwisely sho was sent to sea, and foundered off Cape Hatteras in a storm, sixteen men going down with her. She never was meant to be a sea-going vessel, and thus her loss can- not be laid at her designer's door. CHAPTER II. The Capture of New Orleans. April 24th and 25th, 1862. At the outbreak of the war the Mississippi from Cairo to New Orleans had passed into the hands of the Confederates. The possession of this great stream which sundered the Con- federacy into two unequal parts, which drains the rich and fertile central plains of North America, and which also gives ready access to the he^rt of the Continent, was naturally of immense value to them.* Whilst they held it they could draw corn stuflFs and bacon from the slave states to the west of it — Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, and the greater part of Louisiana. In these states where every man carried his life in his hands, and where blood-feuds linger on to this day, they could recruit admirable soldiers, men who could use the rifle and who did not value life. The Mississippi lost, the great crntres of population in its basin must pass to the North, the Confederacy must lie open, exposed to the attack of Northern armies using the river and its tributaries as their base, the rrsources and food supply of the West would be no longer at the command of the Southerners, and the single land frontier which did not face the North could not be utilised for the importation of war material. '* Uncle Sam's web-feet," as Lincoln called the Union fleet could come and go as they chose, if this river could be wrested from the South. * Lincoln : " The Mississippi is the backbone of the Rebellion ; it is the key to the whole situation." — " Battles and Leaders," ii., 24. The food supply of the South depended upon the West. — Strenzel, United Service Magazine, rxxxi.. 128. .1H IRONCLADS IN ACTION. ' [1861-2 ICvrTy lUTVc wan strained by the North, after the first monlhn of hurried preparations, to reconquer the Mississippi. I'oole, with the Northern river craft, set to work from the norlh — from Cairo «'ind from Cincinnati. Meantime the works which cl()M<*d the mouth of the river, south of New Orleans, were reconnoitred ; and, encouraged by the reports of spies, who aHHcrted that the Southern defences in this direction had hern comparatively neglected, Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secre- tary of the Navy, decided that an attempt should be made t(» force u way past the forts, to New Orleans.* It was a bold undertaking. Duckworth indeed had made his way up the Dardanelles in 1807, with wooden ships, in the troth of powerful batteries, and Washington years before had urged Dt* (Irasse to force a passage under the English works on the York River. These instances Lincoln's advisers mav have had in mind, Thev selected as the Union commander a n\an, who, himself a Southerner, was bv the ironv of fate to tloal the deadliest blow to the South* a sailor almost the equal of Nelson in audacity and promptitude, who, like his English pr\>totype, at once tired his crews with zeal and earned their wannest alYtvtion, David Glasgow Farragut. The ablest adntira) sinct^ NelsonV dav deserxes a word of notice. A \ ii^lnian by l^irth he had ser\*ed on board the Essex m her bUHHly engagx^monts with the English Pkarbe and Ckt^mb. \\\ \^^ he hud InMi^n on board the warship sent bv President .lsicksvM\ to South Carolina, with the curt sentence " The rnioi^ mwst and shall bt^ prfs^^rxtnl." Solicited by his kins- U>lk At Xort\>lk to join the S^ssionists at the outbreak of ii\ ar ho had iKvintcvl to the fl.\g ho h;ui sorvovt so wol*. with the \\\>r\ls. * I wv^M sot^ oxtTv man of vvn: damn^^l K^tort^ I \\ >u!c: raise mv hand against that flog/* And ho had warr,^v: ^:> rtWJlil I862J THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS, 39 friends that "they would catch the devil before they got through with the business." He was in his sixtieth year, but the energy and vigour of youth had not gone from him * On February 20th, 1862, he arrived off the mouth of the Mississippi in his flagship, the screw-sloop Hartford. Up to that date the Northern squadron had been content to blockade the entrances to the river, a tedious business amidst constant fogs and occasional attacks of Confederate rams. Hencefor- ward there were preparations for action and action. The crews were exercised at target practice. The ships were stripped of their upper rigging, and chain cables placed outside their timbers in the way of the engines. These cables were threaded at each end on rods of iron, and hung vertically, giving a measure of protection to the ships. Each length of chain overlapped the next length, and was bound to it with cord. The total weight of iron thus employed was very considerable. Bags of sand and ashes were further piled up inside the ships, forming great bulwarks round the vulnerable portions of the machinery ; and strong nettings were disposed inboard on some of the vessels to stop splinters. The hulls were daubed with the yellow mud of the river to render them similar in colour to the river banks, and thus make the task of the Confederate gunners harder. Before the attack was delivered, the decks and guns were, in some instances, white- washed, to enable the gunners, fighting by night without lights, to see where the various implements in use in the battle lay. This precaution was found to be of the greatest service. On the 16th of April, Farragut led his fleet up the Mississippi to a point three miles below Fort Jackson, the southernmost of the Confederate defences. It was only with the utmost difficulty that the heavier vessels had been taken across the bar which hinders access to the waters of the river. The sands shift • At the close of the war the rank of Vice- Admiral was instituted, and Farra^t promoted to it. In 1866 he was still further advanced to the new rank of Admiral. He died August 14th. 1870. 40 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1862 continually, and the depth was found to be but 15 feet instead of 19 feet as had been anticipated. Though lightened of eventhing, sheer force alone hauled the Pensacola^ the deepest in draught of the Northern ships which fought in the battle, over the banks. The Mississippi was fast for eight days, but at last was brought across. And now the ships were face to face with the Southern defences and could see what had to be done. Two forts interdicted approach to New Orleans. On the right of the river, ascending, was Fort St. Philip, an old- fashioned work supplemented by two water batteries, one on either side of it. On the left was Fort Jackson, built of stone with casemates and a battery of guns en barbette. Round it ran a moat, and inside the work was a second moat encom- passing a citadel. A water batter>' commanded the reach of the river below this fort. In all, in these works were mounted one 13-inch, five lo-inch, and two 8-inch mortars; three lo-inch, nine 8-inch, twelve 42-pounder, twenty-four 32- pounder, and forty-six 24-pounder smooth-bores ; two 7-inch and two 32-pounder rifled guns*; and ten 24-pounder howitzers. There were thus verj* few large guns, only twenty-eight excluding mortars, being of heavier calibre than the 32- pounder. The Confederate commander was conscious of the utter weak- ness of his artiller}*. What g^ns he had were for the most part of antiquated pattern, and those which were recent were cast from improperly tested metal, and were distrusted by their gunners. Application had been made to the Confederate War Department for a supply of heavier and more trustworthy cannon. But partly because of the inadequacy of the Con- federate supply of artiller\-, partly because no one at Richmond could believe that the Northerners would dare to attack New Orleans from below, no guns had been sent ; and the Confederate commander, General Duncan, had to do what he • Firinjj a shot of 60 to Solbs. i862] THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS, 41 ■ could with the guns on the spot. Afloat, or completing, the Confederates had a flotilla which would have been capable of rendering great services if it had possessed trained officers or experienced seamen. There were four ironclads^ not one of which was ready as yet. All were of the Merrimac type, having submerged hulls and casemate-batteries amidships. The New Orleans mounted twenty guns ; the Memphis eighteen ; the Mis- sissippi sixteen. The latter was to steam eleven knots, carried 5 and 6-inch armour, and was 270 feet long. Her cost was 400,000/., and she was being pushed forward with the utmost expedition, the men working on her night and day. ITie Louisiana^ too, was nearing completion. She had a submerged hull and a casemate-battery. Its sides sloped at an angle of forty-five degrees, and were plated with 5 inches of iron. She was fitted with screw propellers, and also with two paddle wheels, placed one in front of the other in a well amidships. They worked extremely badly, forcing the water through the seams of her planking, when started, and flooding the battery deck. Her engines, taken from an old river steamer, were far too weak for her, and would not move her up stream, or keep her under control when descending. She mounted seven 6-inch rifles, two 7-inch rifles, four 8-inch, and three 9-inch smooth-bores. Her gun-ports were much too small, and only admitted of ^\ki degrees of training. A smaller and stranger craft was the little Manassas, designed expressly for ramming ; a tug-boat, cut down to the water line, and protected by railroad iron \ to i-inch thick, upon 5 inches of timber, so curved that her upper works resembled the shell of a tortoise, and would thus, it was hoped, deflect shot. She could only steam {{\^. miles an hour, and had a timber prow for ramming: one 32-pounder was mounted for\%'ard, projecting through a port-hole which was closed by a spring shutter. These vessels belonged to the Confederate States' Navy, and were under the orders of Com- mander Mitchell. He had also the gunboats Governor Moore ii 42 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1862 and General Quitman^ small wooden steamers, protected about their boilers by barricades of pine wood and compressed cotton, and carrying between them one 9-inch gun and eight 32-pounder smooth bores. Finally, there were six armed and seven unarmed steamers of the " River Defence Fleet," which were not under the orders of either the general or naval officer in command, but obeyed only the War Depart- ^ ment at Richmond, when they obeyed anyone. There was neither discipline nor training on board them ; they had no competent naval officers, and no drilled gunners. On the scene of action they behaved with positive cowardice, and thus they could not be seriously reckoned in the defence. Moreover, there was a certain amount of friction between General Duncan and Commander Mitchell, so that the condi- tions were not favourable for the Confederates. It would appear to be essential, when forts and ships are co-operating, that one man should have the control of forces on land and forces on the water. Most important among the Confederate defences was a boom which had been carried across the Mississippi, just below the forts, and under the muzzles of their guns. It was constructed of cypress logs 4 to 5 feet m diameter, fastened together with iron cables of immense strength. Thirty 300olb. anchors held the boom in position, whilst each end was made fast on land. Luck, however, was against the Southerners. The Mis- sissippi is subject to sudden freshets in the spring, and during March, rising to an unwonted height, had carried away the central portion of the boom. Attempts were made to re- construct it, but without success. Finally, eight schooners, each of 200 tons, were anchored in the gap, and fastened to each other and the remnants of the boom with i-inch chains. Their masts were taken out and left to drag astern so as to *^%*\ disable the screws of approaching ships. After Farragut had arrived below the forts, some days were spent by the Federals in making a triangulation of the forts 1 862 THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. 43 and river, and in placing buoys. The Navy Department had dispatched a number of mortar boats which were to prepare the way for the fleet by a vigorous bombardment. These vessels were placed in position before the i8th of April. They numbered twenty vessels in three divisions. The first and third divisions containing thirteen schooners were moored in line close under the southern (Fort Jackson) bank of the river, the leading schooner being distant 2950 yards from Fort Jackson. Here they were hidden by trees and by a slight b<-nd of the river. That their masts might not betray them, they were dressed with branches. The second division of seven schooners was under the opposite bank, the leading vessel 3900 yards from Fort Jackson, and in view of the Confederate gunners. On the morning of the i8th the schooners opened their fire, pitching their huge 13-inch shells into Fort Jackson at intervals of ten minutes. The northern division could see where each shell dropped, and tht'reforc fired with most effect, but. on the other hand, was exposed to the Confederate projectiles. The gunners in the fort gradually found the range, and about mid-day began to hit the schooners with heavy shot, on which the second division changed its position. The gunboat Owasco supported the mortar vessels. taking turns with other Federal vessels in drawing off the Confederate fire, and escaped injury herself by keeping in constant motion. At ^w o'clock in the afternoon dtnse smoke was seen rising from the fort. With nightfall tht- mortar vessels increased their rate of fire, whilst the second division, after two vessels had been all but sunk, joined the other schooners undrr the shelter of the southern bank. .-X hugr fire-raft was sent down by the Conft-derates, hut faihd to harm any ship. Dav after dav the bombardment continued. The garrison of th<- fort were annoyed by the steady rain of sh(*lls. and tin* magazines wrre nearly hit twicr, yet the damage done was not ver\' srrious. Thr men were kept insidt* the cisematt-s. though in the water batter}' they were never driven from their 44 IRONCLADS IN ACTION, [1862 guns. In short, the fort was by no means silenced, and the many thousands of shells fired produced far less effect than might have been expected. Colonel Higgins, however, who was in command of Fort Jackson, fearing that the garrison would be demoralised, was anxious that the Louisiana should come down and attack the schooners, but the naval officers had other views. She was not ready, they urged ; she could not reach the Federals with her guns, and finally she could not be exposed to high-angle fire. The unhappy effects of the division of command are manifest.* Oi^ the night of April 20th, supported by an unusually fierce bombardment, the two gunboats Pinola and Itasca were sent upstream to make an opening in the boom. Their rigging and their masts had been taken out on the previous day, but none the less they were seen and fired upon, though without effect. Running alongside the third schooner from the northern bank, they attempted, unsuccessfully, to blow her up. On the failure of this her moorings were slipped, but the Itasca^ which was fast to her and had not expected her to be let go, was carried on shore by the current under the very guns of the fort, and was only got off by the Pinola after two hawsers had parted. The Pinola then rammed the boom, running at it under full steam, with great effect, and opened a wide passage. This was reconnoitred three nights later, as the Federal officers were not altogether certain that there was not a chain across, below the water-level, or submerged mines. Lieutenant Caldwell in a boat examined the gap with a sounding line, and was able to report to Farragut at eleven o'clock that all was clear. Though the Confederates must have seen him they did not fire upon him. * The small size of the Louisiana's port-holes limited the ran^e of her guns, as the latter could not be elevated. Yet in spite of this and her weak engines, she might have been towed down to the boom to attack the mortar-boats. Admiral Porter and General Duncan hold that she could have done more than she did. Scharf, however, maintains that the Confederate Navy, did all that could be expected. — Hist, Confed. States' Navy, p. 282-3. 1862] THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS, 45 It was a matter of necessity to make the attack at the earliest date possible. The Confederate ironclads were being rapidly completed, and it was manifest to Farragut that the mortars had not crushed the forts. The 16,800 shells pitched into them had killed or wounded eighteen men, and disabled ten guns out of 126. But the constant alarms and excursions had to some extent shaken the morale of the garrison in Fort Jackson,, and it was noticed during the attack that they did not shoot so straight or so steadily as the men in Fort Philip, who had not been exposed to the bombardment. Colonel Higgins was certain that the hour of attack was at hand from various signs, the breaking of the boom and the activity of the Federals, and had stirred Mitchell up once more. In response to his entreaties the Louisiana had been brought down and moored near the forts. She was far from ready, and there were fifty artificers still at work upon her. Farragut had decided upon the night of the 23rd for his great venture. His ships were to ascend in three divisions. Id the first division were the Cayuga (2 guns), the Pensacola {2^), t\\Q Mississippi (17), the Oneida (9), the Varuna (10), the Katahdin (2), the Kineo (2), and the Wissahickon (2). Iq command as divisional officer, was Captain Bailey on board the Cayuga, The second division was commanded by Farra- gut himself, who led in the Hartford (24) , followed by the Brooklyn (20), and the Richmond {22), In the third division were the Sciota (2), the Iroquois (7), the Kennebec (2), the Pinola (2). the Itasca (2), and the Winona (2) under the charge of Commander Bell. Excluding the mortar flotilla,* th<» fleet brought to bear 192 guns and howitzers, only forty-six of which were smaller in calibre than the 42-pounder. One- round from every gun in the Federal ships would give a weight of metal amounting to over 20,ooolbs.t ; from every gun in the Confederate forts and ships only a little over • This mounted no guns. t For deUils of ship*' and forts' batteries, set Table II. 46 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1862 yooolbs. But in appraising the odds we must remember the immense advantage which forts have over ships. Originally Farrag^t had intended that the most powerful ships should lead, and thus prepare the passage for the lighter and weaker craft. He had given way reluctantly to his officers who pointed out that it would be a real danger to expose himself, as he intended, by leading the way in the Hartford* In response to their entreaties his flagship was in the centre of the line. On the 23rd he had personally inspected ever}* vessel under his command. Howitzers were sent up to the tops and protected by breastworks of boiler plate, whilst boats and all possible spars were left ashore. 'The want of ahead -fire in the fleet was a verv serious defect for the work now in hand ; not a single gun would bear right ahead. As the ships would in turn use either broadside, it should be remembered that about 60 per cent of any Northern vessel's guns could be fought on either side. The gunboats, however, carried only pivots, and could use both their guns. The report that the passage through the boom was open was made at eleven in the evening. The night was clear and stilK and when at two oVlock in the morning of April 24th, the signal was made to get under weigh, the click of the capstans and rattle of the cables at once told the Con- federates that the fleet was pref)aring to move. The alarm in the forts was sounded and the men stood to their guns, waiting anxiously for the fire-rafts, which Commander Mitchell was to have sent down to show their opponents clearly. The rafts were late in coming, and in darkness the Federal line neared the forts, moving slowly up-stream and delayed greatly bv the vehemence of the current. As soon as the fleet was under way the mortar vessels opened, firing at their fastest, and their great shells, dropping, left long tracks of smoke behind them, and burst with a fearful din in the forts. The CtiVNi^tt passed tht* lu>on^ before the Confederates opened in iS62] THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS, 47 reply. Not a gun could she bring to bear, but under the storm of shot and shell she stood boldly on. She was hit from stem to stern, and the air was full of bursting shells. Noting that the Confederates were aiming for the centre of the stream, her officers took her in close under the bank, and gave the gunners grape and canister. A thick screen of smoke was descending upon the river, and this in no small degree helped her and the vessels which followed her. Her masts and rigging were riddled, but her hull escaped grave injury. She had made the run at full speed and distanced all the^ other ships. On looking back her commander was appalled to discover himself alone. Ahead were eleven Confederate gunboats ; astern impenetrable smoke ; and for a moment he thought that the enterprise had miscarried, and that the heavier ships had failed to pass the forts. Second, originally, was the Pensacola^ but the Varuna^ going full speed, quickly passed her and reached waters where the guns of the forts could no longer harm her. She was closely followed by the Oneida^ which had steamed so near in under Fort Philip that the fire from the Confederate guns scorched her men, and the sparks flew on board. But the storm of projectiles flew over her harmlessly, and neither she nor the Varuna suffered hurt. The PensacolUy dropping back to the fourth place and closely followed by the Mississippi^ went very slowly past the forts. So close were the two com- batants to each other that, above the din of the unceasing rannonade, the ships' crews could hear the officers' orders in the forts, the soldiers' curses and jeers, and answered them sailor- fashion. Thus, as they fought, the two sides railed each at the other. The Mississippi was hulled ten times, but except a slight injury to her outer shaft-bearing, she was none the worse. Yet her troubles were not over, for just as she had passed the forts a dangerous antagonist came down upon her. The Manassas ^ almost flush with the water, had charged the Pensacola first, but the Federal ship sheered and avoided her onset. Then, bounding for^'ard at her fullest 48 IROXCLADS IX ACTION. [1862 speed through the dense smoke, and helped by the current, she struck the Mississippi a glancing blow, which did not penetrate the timbers of the Union ship's side. Next the Katahdin passed the forts with a shell in her funnel and a shot through her foremast, but without a scratch on any of her men. The Wissahickon followed her closely, and was about as much damaged. Farragut's division had, either from the impatience of its commander, or from some delay of the leading squadron, gained steadily upon it, so that, in passing the boom, the Brooklyn collided with the Kineo, but neither vessel was ■r damaged. The Hartford, in front of them, had opened upon Fort Jackson with her bow guns, receiving in return a most galling fire. Fire-rafts were now at last beginning to come down the river, but too late to give the Confederate gunners much help. The smoke from the guns of the forts and the ships hung in an almost impenetrable curtain over the still waters, shrouding the ships from the gaze of the Confederates, and thus rendering Farragut's passage much easier. But, in the gloom, a fresh danger assailed the flagship. The little Confederate tug Moshcr came down the stream, pushing in front of her a huge fire raft. She was of wood herself, and therefore exposed to the danger of fire ; whilst the bright light from the flames made her a splendid mark at close quarters for the Hartford's guns. Half-a-dozen men were her crew, under the command of one Sherman, and they all paid for their heroism with their lives. They drove their raft upon the I'nion ship amidst a hail of projectiles, and instantly the tongues of fire licked the Hartford's side, played in through her gun-ports, and ran up her rigging. It was the critical moment of the engagement, and what added to the danger of the Hartford was that, in endeavour- ing to avoid the fire-raft, she had taken the ground under the xcry gruns of Fort Philip. The hostile gunners could be heard shouting ; the flagship's bowsprit all but touched the shore. Ever}- gun that would bear in Fort Philip opened 1862] THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS, 49 upon her, and, thus beset, she barely escaped destruction. Never for a moment did Farragut lose his self-control, though, as the flames shot up, he was heard to cry, ** My God, is it to end in this way ? ** It was not to end thus. Fortune smiles upon the brave, and, animated by the gallant bear- ing of their leader, the sailors faced the flames as fearlessly as they had faced the enemy's guns. Fire-quarters were sounded, and the hoses were brought to bear upon the blazing masts, whilst, just above the heads of the men on deck, flew the iron hail from the fort. As the men fell back from their guns before the fire, Farragut shouted to them, ** Don't flinch from that fire, boys I There is a hotter fire for those who don't do their duty. Give that rascally little tug a shot/' Meantime the engines went astern. By Farra- gut's prevision the heavy weights were in the bows of the ships, so that, if they grounded, it would be forward, when the stream would not swing them round athwart the river, as it would have done had they taken the ground aft. Slowly the Hartford got clear, helped, perhaps — though this is doubtful — by a thrust from the ram Manassas, which was passing her. With only one man killed and nine wounded, the flagship once more went ahead, and passed out of range of the Confederates, disabling on her way a steamer full of troops, which made for her, and seemed inclined to board. The Brooklyn did not get off so lightly. In the dense smoke she lost sight of the Hartford^ and fouled the boom after, as we have seen, colliding with the Kineo. The ship fell off across the river, her bow grazing the left bank, whilst Fort Philip poured a furious fire in upon her. Here, again, there was splendid gallantry and discipline. Her captain. Craven, stood calm and motionless on deck; her quarter-master at the starboard main chains, whilst bullets struck the ship's side about him, calmly called the soundings. The guns in Fort Jackson got her range, and struck her repeatedly. A midshipman and the signal quarter-master m-erc cut in two. The steersman received a serious wound, E so IROXCLADS AV ACTIOX. ri862 but refused to go below. At last the ship got dear of the boom, and went ahead through the gap, but had only just passed it when a violent jar was felt, and she stopped, right under the guns of the forts. Her propeller had struck some- thing floating in the water, and it was feared that she would have to anchor, to her o^ti speedy destruction. The command, •' Stana by the starboard anchor " was given, and the men were read\ to let it go, when once more the ship moved. There was a xTgorous exchange of fine with Fort Jackson, the gra{>e frv>m the Federal guns flying in upon the Confederates, while the fort seemed to be full of "lamp-posts," as the stands which held the grape were called. A shot from the Ion entered the port of No. 9 gun in the port battery, took oflF the head of the captain of the gun, and wounded nine men, lea\"ing onN* two of the gun crew standing. Covered by ihis fierce fire the ram Mav^ss^is charged the Brook/ra at the fullesi speed of which her slow engines would admit. The cr\\ ** The ram '" rang through the ship, foDowed by the orders ** Full speed '' and " Staiboard ihe helm." With a shivk which r* early took :he men on ihe Federal shq> off :he:r tee:, the .Vsf:j:ss£s wer.t ir.io :he i^'rp/.-r/rp amidships, ,s.r.d. is she rirr.rr.ed her. f.re^ her one ^,:r.- The chain armour C'S.ve c»>»>d protection : and bevor.d cr,:sh:r.^ it inio the outer riL^nkin*:. ,ir.d sr'ir.terinir the i:n:ibrrs inside. :acki}v on a coal r.ur.ker. :\:'."- o: coil. the ram :nf.>cted 2:ttje hiArm. Had tht b,:nker bten trr.pn* there rr.icht hi\ e bet- n a^oiher siorv • ~» • r" " T^"^- <*^ V •■--,•>—« "Sr" »-^--- ,- — ,T le--^*,,- •-\-»-. •t=»^- 3:*^."Y\'-f* *Vi»=- witer-lire. i^rd w,as r-rc-i^^^ht *::> bv rhc SL.nd hiiC> txjed round the ste-arr. dr*:r:. As the AL/;ru:ss£s s:r»:ck the i^nv^r/rr i rr.-r.r c-c^-t o^t o: the trap di>or or. the ri.Tr. and rur.nirig- :dr%\-Lrd whilst iht ships i^ere in contact jooked t: sre i^h-Li nii^n*ii^e hi.d heer. don:. Thi cuin er-rTi 2^t:r :r the chains o: ■•-, .. .,. , .... .. , , him ."-r. ihe heic knocking: h:m of: th: rLrt.ie drck into ihe witer Nv"^nf o: the J^'^u^'i.'yK s c'*^t.< cz^ufi he c-ve-.n ^ei^resiyon enough tr hit the A^^BiKoicc.t, iud she irot of i862] THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. 51 unscathed. A minute or two later a large Confederate vessel came up, but was received with a hail of shells at a distance of only sixty yards, which instantly set her on fire. Nearing Fort Philip the Brooklyn ran past the Hartford^ then fast aground, when with singular gallantry Craven deter- mined not to leave his chief to bear alone the storm of fire. Deliberately he did one of the most heroic actions of the war, and stopping his engines he dropped down to succour the Hartford, The Confederates turned their guns upon him, giving the Hartford a respite, but, fortunately for him, fired too high, as the shot and shell passed above the Northern ship, and cut her rigging to pieces. Not till the flagship was clear of the fire raft, and off the shoal, did the Brooklyn quit her station. Then, standing up past Fort Philip, she gave the gunners there a bad five minutes. At a distance of only 100 feet she poured in canister and grape, and the men in the tops could see the Confederates in the fort running for dear life to shelter. None the less there were some who stood to their guns, and the Brooklyn had a warm reception. The lieutenant in charge of the first division of guns was hit, but would not go below till he had sighted and fired two guns with his own hand. A marine had his head taken oflf by a shot, and a shell dropping amongst the crew of the forward pivot gun blew its powder man to atoms. The fire of their enemy's guns scorched the faces of the Brooklyn's men. Feeling his way through the dense smoke, which only gave occasional glimpses of the other ships, Craven passed Fort Philip when a fresh danger loomed up before him. Moored above the fort was the Louisiana, which rumour had pictured as a terrible antagonist. At her the Brooklyn aimed a broadside, but the shots could be seen striking the ironclad and glancing up. This fire however wounded two of the Louisiana s officers who were exposed on her deck In reply the Southern ship discharged every gun that she could bring to bear, and hulled the Brooklyn with a heavy shell upon her cut-water. Luckily for the Northerners the shell did not E 2 52 IROSCLADS IX ACTION. [1862 explode as the Confederates had failed to remove the lead cover from the fuse. The Brooklyn went forward and plunged into the confused struggle which was raging above the forts. In all she had been more than an hour engaged with the forts, and yet her loss had been only eight killed and twentv-six wounded. The Richmond was detained by the foaming of her boilers, but passed the forts just after they had been roughly handled by the Hartford and Brooklyn. Colonel Higg^ins the Con- federate commander s exclamation, when he saw these ships escape him was characteristic, ** Better go to cover, boys ; our cake is all dough. The Old Xa\y has won." So, as the Confederates were under cover, the Richmond lost only t%vo killed and four wounded. The nettings inboard proved most useful, catching a large number of splinters and doubtless saving many lives. Her commander notices in his report the immense advantage which is conferred for night action by whitewashing the decks and gun carriages. The second division had thus passed the forts without any vor>- serious damage to ships or loss of life. The third attempted to follow. The Iroquois, originally second in the line, quickly outstripped her leader, the Sciofa, and was engaged about four o clock. Whilst she was exchanging fire with the forts two Confederate vessels, the gun-boat Macrae and a ram, came up on her quarter and poured into her a briwdsido of grape. In reply she gave her opponent canister and one 11 -inch shell, wounding her commander and forcing her to retreat. Just as she was clearing the forts, through a misuiuU rstanding of the order ** Starboard *' for *• Stop her " she w as run alonosido the Louisiana, whose gunners, double- shotting their guns, gave hor a destructive broadside. A minute later she was attacked by six steamers, but drove thiin otT with >luU. Her rigging was much damaged, her lHK\ts were sn\,ishod, and her loss in men was hea\y. Eight were killed and twei\ly-four wounded. The Sciofa suffered very little. i8^)-> THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. 53 The Pinola^ coming third, opened fire as soon as she was abreast of Fort Jackson, but as before, when the Confederates replied, their shot and shell passed over the- heads of the Northerners only killing one man. Off Fort Philip, however, the fire rafts showed up the ship, and at a range of 150 yards she was struck repeatedly. The pump-well was damaged ; the escape-pipe cut ; the wheel broken ; and the ship set on fire in the neighbourhood of the magazine. On fire-quarters being sounded the gunner's mate, Frisbee, who was inside the magazine, instantly closed the scuttles, remaining within The fire, however, was extinguished without difficulty, and this ship also passed the forts. She had three killed and seven wounded. The Kennebec^ which should, by the original plan, have followed the Iroquois^ came into line behind the Pinola. On reaching the boom she caught in it and was exposed to a very heavy fire. When she disengaged herself, she found that the ships in advance were out of sight, and that she would have alone to face the terrible cross-fire. A weak and small vessel she did not make the attempt, which meant almost certain destruction, but fell back. Following her came the Itasca and Winona, The Itasca passed the opening in the boom, but when abreast of Fort Jackson was very severely handled. The Confederate projectiles rained about her, and many struck her, several passing through her. A 42-pounder shot came through a coal bunker and pierced her boiler ; the steam escaping violently, drove everyone from the fire-room into the engine-room, and almost suffocated those on the quarter-deck. The vessel, having lost her motive power, turned with her rt*maining speed and floated slowly down the river. Her crew were ordered to throw themselves flat on deck, and thus escaped heavy loss. When beyond the range of the forts, her commander ran her on shore, finding that she was making water verj* fast, but afterwards floated her off again, sini'r he discovered that the leak was not so bad as he had supposed. His loss was three wounded or scalded. The 54 IROXCLADS I\ ACTION. [1862 Winona came last. As she followed closely upon the Itasca, that ship backed upon her to avoid the masts trailing from schooners of the boom, and the two ships were entangled and delayed half an hour. WTien the Winona again proceeded on her way. the day was breaking, and her hull stood out against the sky, a good mark for the Confederates. Fort Jackson opened a most destructive fire upon her, in four shots killing or wounding eveiy man at her heavj' rifled pivot. The smoke prevented her commander from seeing clearly his way, and he stood in veiy close to Fort Philip, almost running on shore. The guns of the Confederate works played upon the gunboat with great effect, and the spray from the falling projectiles splashed her deck. It was madness to persist in the attempt, alone and unsupported, in broad daylight, to steam between the forts. Reluctantly she obeyed a signal of recall from Commander Porter, having lost three killed and five wounded. Three ships thus failed to pass the forts, the Itasca^ Winona, and Pinola* Meantime, whilst one by one the Northern vessels were defiling past the Confederate gunners, a confused struggle was raging above the forts, and to it we must recur. The Confederates had. as we have seen, a considerable flotilla, and this had to be encountered and defeated before Captain Farragut*s ships could make their way to New Orleans. The Cavu^a had been the first to leave behind her the terrible cross-fire. Emerging from the smoke she saw ahead three large steamers which simultaneously charged her. Two were in quick succession hulled with ii-inch and 30-pounder shells which set them on fire and drove them (^ft\ The third came on. and boarders were readv on either side, when the Wtrnna arrived on the scene and disabled the Confederate with a shiU. The new-comer then steamed up • All thrvc wriv sinall v^«i»rl*» And tlwwr faUuif points to the expediency of usiuji lujji' ,uul str\)n|{ »>* IW six g«ns which these three vrsisrl.'* i\*rrir\| btlW« *■ *^ fi'* ^ ***^ forts. THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. 55 the river through what was left of .the Confederate flotilla. A dangerous antagonist, however, was following her unobserved. Lieutenant Kennon, of the Southern gunboat Governor Moore, had heard the beat of paddles in the stillness of the night and given the alarm. And now, a few minutes later, he saw, emerging from the smoke of the ungagemcnl raging between the forts, the masts of a large steamer. He knew her by her dialingulshing lights, and followed at once, keeping under the shelter of the bank. With oil in his tires, he quickly over- hauled her, and hoisting Federal lights, stood towards her. The Varuna's people did not know him for an enemy, and allowed him to come up, when, just as day broke, he lowered hU false lights and opened. A warm action followed, in which Kennon, coming to very close (Quarters, deliberately fired his bow chaser through his own buw, hoping to hit his enemy below the water-line and sink him. Foltowing this, he rammed his antagonist twice in succes- sion, but his ship was set on fire by the Varuna's shells, and had her engine disabled into the bargain. She drifted down stream having lost fifty-seven killed and seventeen wounded out of a crew of ninety-three. This fact speaks volumes for the dauntlessness of the Confederates. Fired upon by the Federal fthips which were following the Varuna, Kennon ran the Governor Moore ashort- and got off all who were left alive. The Varuna had not, however, disposed of all her enemtex. Suddenly the Stonevall "Jackson came on her out of the twilight and rammed her twice. The Varuna. sinking (a*t, plied the Conlcdcrate with shell and drove her off, but waa forced to run on shore herself. Here her guns were (ought till the water covered her deck. Meantime the Stone- teall Jackson steamed up stream, and was abandoned and set on fire by her commander. The Varuna's crew were rescued by (he now rapidly arriving Frdenil ships. The Oneida wa« the third ship to engage the gunboats. She charged a Confederate vessel with a great crash just above the fort*, and, standing on past the gunboats, came 56 IROXCLADS I\ ACT/OX. [1862 u|>on the shattered Girvernor Moore^ who signalled that she was " the United States steamer Mississippi ^ The Federals were not so easily taken in, and opened a smart fire upon her, after which they lowered boats and captured her with Commander Kennon. The last act of the dav's eventful fighting was an attempt made by the Manassas to ram the Pinola. She was coming up astern when the Pinola^s men saw her, and gave her a shot from their heaNy rifle. Almost at the same minute the Mississippi bounded forward, and endeavoured to run her down. But though she had been much shaken by her frequent attempts to ram, and though her engines were never good for ven* much, she eluded the Mississippi, ran ashore, and was set on fire by her crew. The Union ship riddled her with shot unaware that she was abandoned. That same morning the fleet compelled the surrender of a Confederate force at Chalmette. Forts Jackson and Philip still held out, but their fall was only a question of time. They were cut off from the Confederacy, and their garrisons, unable to obtain food or ammunition, much shaken and demoralised by the bombardment, surrendered on .-Kpril 29. Four days earlier Farragut's fleet had anchored off Xew Orleans. The consequences of this engagement, followed as it was almost immediately by the capture of the forts and New i>rK\ins. cannot be over-estimattni. It was the third great blow whi\ h the Federal navv had struck during the war, and if it wer^^ of less imjH^rtance than the battle between the .l/«rr>f„\ and Ms^niT^r^ w was ol greater moment both to victors and to \anquishiHl than the capture of Port Royal.* It lesscnovl the number ot jH^rts to bt* bKx kaded by one, and that one ,i port which, v^winjj; to the nature of the coast, the numennjs mouths ot the ri\cr. the cv^n^xarative proximity of Max ana, and the exvvlKnt communication trvMU it inland, both by rail and by water, was exceptionally well sit^iated for the • HomKlI\U^l AnU OAj^tuixsl b\ ,* !ivj\;.uh\v*\ w ^vvv.<-n sKijvs under Captain 1 862] THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. si blockade-runner's trade. The Confederate forts on the Central Mississippi could now be taken in rear, and the final opening of the river was foreshadowed. Nor is Farragut's victory without military importance. It showed that forts alone cannot forbid passage to a fleet, even when the channel which they command is narrow, tortuous, and swept by a rapid current. Luck, of course, was on the side of the Northerners. Had not the freshet accommodatingly broken the boom, their task would have been, if not im|>ossible, at any rate very much harder. All admiration is due to Farragut for his daring and resolution, but there are certain circumstances to be taken into account when con- sidering the small damage done to the fleet. Firstly, a large number of the garrison were Northerners who had asked to be permitted to serve in the forts that they might not be compelled to fight against their country. There were in addition many Irish and Germans. So bad was the feeling of the men that they broke into open mutiny and spiked many of the guns on April 27th. We can well believe that an affection for the North would not tend to good shooting on the part of the gunners. They knew the ranges, and yet their fire almost uniformly passed above the heads of the Federals. We must also remember that they had been much shaken by the bombardment. Fort Philip maintained a more accurate fire than Fort Jackson, which mav be accounted for by the fait that during the preliminary bombardment it had received ver\' little attention from the Federals. High- angle fire on this occasion produced but small result. The mortar vessels discharged bombs till their ammunition ran short, but for all practical purposes Fort Jackson was intact after all this sound and furj'. Yet Farragut still retained some faith in them, and in his subsequent actions upon the Mississippi used them for bombardments.* Secondly, we must recall the • •• He was convinced that the flet-t rould run by the furls, and anticipated nochinj; but delay from the bombardment."— Mahan, " Farragut," 124. But Porter (Naval History, 272) maintains that he spoke of mortar-vessels in the kif best termi. \ .. 5S IROSCLADS I\ ACTIO \. [1862 indiflFerent nature of the artiller)-, which the Confederate works mounted. Had Colonel Higgins' and General Duncan's entreaties for heavier guns been complied with, the issue of the action might have been different. Twelve guns throwing shot of 681bs. and up>\*ards were not a very large allowance for the defence of a port of such political and strategical impor- tance. Xo doubt the physical difficulties to be faced by the Federal contributed in some measure to the heedlessness which the Confederate War Office showed in this direction. To ascend a swift river in the face of the most moderate opposition is a difficult task, and the South looked rather for a descent from the north. Thirdly, there was the fatal defect of divided command. Had the forts, the ironclads, and gun- boats been under the direction of one man, the Confederate resistance would have had far more chance of success. Instead there were no less than three various commanders. There was General Duncan in charge of the forts, there was Commander Mitchell with the vessels of the Confederate navy, and there were the •' River Defence '* boats whose captains did each what seemed s^H>d in his own eves. The officers and men of the Confederate na\y fought with a g^lantry to the full as ijreat as that of Farragut's sailors, but they did not act in vombinat ion. Fire rafts were not sent down as they should have been at the commencement of the attack, and the most was not mavic ot the L^st:s:iiHj, The " River Defence" s.\ilv^rs divl not understand in the least what was to be expect t\l tr\>n\ brave men. *' When I saw all those ships cominjj." s.uvl one captain. " 1 just fired the vessel and skip|vd." This man havl no idea of fighting resolutely a^^aiit^t >in at vxlvis. anvt it is such resolution which often wins whv^n thv^ chanvv v'^t suvxvss ap^vars hopeless. Fourthlv, thv^r\^ wvtv^ nv> mines or tor^nxKn^s sowed in the channel. Nv^t nMu^ v*l thoc cv^nstdvTativ^ns v:etrac:s frv>m the reputation ot Kana^u; Thv^ ta^k the upper Mississippi. The struggle in this direction was one of enormous importance, but in it the army played as gfreat a part as the fleet. Yet without ships it would have been impossible for the Northern commanders to clear the river and thus to sunder the Confederacy. Naval power here also exercised great influence upon the struggle, and its intelligent employment may be watched with profit, though the theatre of the contest was a river and not the sea. The Confederates in 1862 were very firmly planted on both sides of the river. Strong works were constructed or under construction below New Orleans, at Baton Rouge, Vicks- burg, Memphis, Island No. 10, Fort Pillow, and Columbus; whilst on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers stood Forts Henry and Donelson. The latter protected the left flank of the South from the direct attack of the Northern armies, and was well adapted to serve as a base, in the event of an attempt being made to realise the Confederate aim of pushing for- ward the frontier to the Ohio River, and threatening the Northern States of Illinois and Ohio. A large number of Confederate ironclads were under construction at various points on the Mississippi. They were generally similar in design to the Merrimac^ casemated ships, plated with rail- road iron. OJ IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1861 In the spring of 1861 the North had set to work to build a rivrr fleet* Three wooden steamers were purchased, their boilers protected by coal bunkers, and smooth-bore guns mounted. They were followed by nine small and thinly armourtnl gun-boats built at Cairo by Mr. Eads in the short S|Kice of a hundred days.* They were propelled by paddles, carried casemates protei^ted by 24 inches of oak and 2 inches to 3 inches of iron forward* but had only the iron without the oak Amidshi(vs and astern ; they had conical pilot houses ; and their %^rmament of S-inch and 32-pounder smooth-bores, with 4 j-fHHinder rifles* was so disposed as to give them a powerful b\>\v tirt\ They were \*erj* slow and somewhat unmanageable, rheir (Kiddle-wheels were generally placed amidships in a gap left in the hulK and were thus protected by the casemates, rhirtv-eijjht wxxnien rafts, to carrj' each one 13-inch mortar, wert^ Also cv>n^|Jeted. A gre-at mistake was made in giving the ri\er flolilU an inadequate thickness of armoor. and in t^ilin^ t\> jvrv^evi the decks, which w^re much exposed to a (Juu^tn^ tirt^ tcvvn wxvrks plac^ upon the bhxffsw generally s^«s< uKJ ::-K>. X-Oitt 5x ■^kv: TV ~iic»i 4;>owvixattsc<- INW- %*Bv AitotJU;^ ^t;» ,Qv % -«>• X-'v*. ^r' t:**^*? %»*i> ATC trs^ liar •>*«^rr»T '^ I^W^>^^«N^ %».vsv ^ittvvtw ■» ^amv ^v \^^ "i-Ai:s „;."^- ;:t'Sii'^> j^' :l-»i THE OPENING OF THE HISSlSStPP!. In September, 1861, lighting began between these vessels and Confederate forts, or bodies of troops, on the banks of the MUsissipi, Tennessee, and Cumberland. On November 6th two of the gunboats covered the re-embarkalion of Grant's army at Belmont, saving it from almost certain destruction. On Januarj- nth, 1862. the De Kalb and Essex engaged a Confederate floating battery at Columbus, and inflicted some injur>' upon it. But the serious work began with the com- bined mililary and naval attack upon Fort Henry, where were batteries on both sides of the Tennessee River, manned by aSco Confederates, and mounting 10-inch smooth-bores and 6ri#:ratr camp was ablaze, and f§*r,*rA. f sTk:.* -. y»Tf': rA ro ''yvo men had deployed for the ;%**AiV 7:.'' \f,r':\w v,f,nT\f\*'A m^n on board the Essex were fh'i". y\in\*\f'x,*^f\ try fh': n^:ws that their sufferings had not \i** u v,n.f'f\ l5v th'T ^'^u^^f^.n(U:^ rA the fort, the Tennessee 1'1','r v^;r; o|j#-7i''l fo th^: North, and this, as the river led iitin tli#' vrry firart of thfr Confederacy, to the north of ALih.im.i ;irifl Miisissippi and thf: south of Tennessee, enabled iIm Nortlirrn trorips to thrcatfrn these districts and the ex- liiriMlv irri|iorl;int railrriarl, which, joining Charleston and MriM|ilii'., Win \\\r only through route between East and West. Alhi llir ia|ilurr oi th(r fort, the three wooden gunboats |iii»lir«l on n|» the river, (lcstroy(?(l the railway drawbridge, Iniinl timr ( unhMlrralf transports laden with powder and niilit.iiN '.foirs. .ind capturrd a lint- steamer — the Eastport \\\\\\ .( x.i'.t tju.mlity of provisions. The damage thus nillh It'tl w.r* innnrnsr. sinrt' all thrso stores were urgently nrrdrd l»> ihr t ontrilrr.ite troops. loll l>\»nelson iliil lu^t long survive Fort Henr\'. It was \ \m •.hoMi^ii woik; iiuleeil. it nuijht he called the key to \\w »»iii\Mnosi i\MUi\lerate line v>l viefenees. extending from V v»l\nMl»u'. tv» l»K»\\!;no iireen llu' i^arrison mustered no Uwvi \\\\\\ '• vs\^ •:u:>. ,i'ul the !:;:!>> :rv'»i::i:ed were hea\*A". 1 i "v;'-'-*; ■•.\*-". v*v :s*i:*v^ s!*w:h-;v^r>^ ».:o\\ rw^ird. On ■* •• **«N» X v., ' v.ACV-.... iiOnL I ». XI- ' .ill I '^% **» ■*•». •■••"^•»» ««■ .« h » • THE LOWER MISSISSIPPI 5t«J« cf Mile. 4 i862j THE OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 65 The leading vessels ran on till they were only four hundred yards from the Confederates, who hit them repeatedly. The Louisville was raked by' shells, and had her steering-gear disabled. The De Kalb was struck in her pilot-house, and her pilot was killed. Both these vessels began to drift out of the battle, whilst the Carondelet and Pittsburg caught the full force of the Confederate fire. They^ were repeatedly struck between wind and water, and all the pro- jections outside their armour were either shot away or much battered. Their plates were shattered and torn, and two of their rifled guns burst inside the casemates. At the end of ninety minutes' fighting there was nothing left for them but retreat, and this was all the more annoying because the Con- federates gave signs of flinching. The fleet lost in all eleven killed and forty-three wounded, whilst it suffered a decided check. Next day, however, the effect of the bombardment was seen, when Grant delivered an assault with his land forces. The enemy were found to be demoralised, and surrendered on February i6th. Thus the centre of the Confederate line had passed into the hands of the Union troops. Bowling Green on the right was promptly abandoned, and now Columbus alone was left, to be evacuated on March 2nd. After the reduction of these works. Grant with a large army was conveyed up the Tennessee to Pittsburg landing. The Confederates, now greatly alarmed, made desperate efforts to crush him, and a great army concentrated around him at Shiloh under General Johnston. On April 6th, 1862, the battle, one of the bloodiest in the war, began. With iron resolution the Southerners pressed for^^'a^d, and steadily drove the Northerners back on the river Tennessee. On the left the Confederates were massing for a final charge, which should give them not only Kentucky and Tennessee, but Ohio. Missouri, and the West, when unlooked for succour arrived to save the North. As the Southern charge rolled forward, a great mass of yelling men, the Lexington and Tyler opened an enfilading fire upon them with grape and canister. The F //y IHOSCLAD}^ IS ACTIOS. '1862- Noriij^rij v^ldi^n- raJlitd, and the fortune of the fight ^"as 4 imiiprf^, NVxt day the Confederates feO back, ha\ing tourt«T^d dnradful Ic^s, and Grant was left master of the VVIm'Ii ("olurnbus fell the Northerners advanced down tiirt'litn against Island No. 10, and whilst Grant was battling round Sliiloh a M*ortr(| by tlu^ flotilla, was operating here. There were iHo I liahiM'lh past i\H* island, which lay in a bend. The iMiillimi onr wah < losed by obstructions; the southern barred by i ohb'ijrral*' batteries. Above the Confederates lay the I'liiiHi lliM't ; below them the Union army.* It was absolutely Ml I ibhary b»r the su(ees.s of the military operations that one HI hiore ^iinl)oatN should be brought down to the lower reach nl Ihr ihri, when all the Confederate supplies, which came b\ NNfili I, I oiihl be intereepted. A canal was cut across the Mi i k ul (he bend, by which transports could pass from above ill bi loNN Kbuul NiL 11^ but the draught of the gunboats WHuld \\\\\ jMiiuit them to use this convenient and direct u«ulv I lu i»hl\ louise left was for a gunboat to run past \\\\ U.\\\\ \W^. <\\\\\ \\\v ( V<^^>/* be lvK>it. as the Confederate ironclads .\\ \ iuv'Uj I's'UU^ tv» the MHith were approaching completion,. uivl yyh^ »\ lbs \ \\s u u\ulv the truusjK>rts below Island No. 10 yy^.viM Us .s\ \,\kk\ umv \ Ow the uight of April ist. 1862^ iU^ w kv w A4 p»v^M»vvl b\ si KkU iittdck upon the upper tia^iy vO IJ u»vl \v» u» the \\ork ^\a.s rushed before the y .iuit »tv "Ov - ^♦.ivl Mnu* u* ftt4.tt the rum part, and seven guns yy.i, .|»»kvvl \\iU»v»Mi. Uv U>ss o^ JL Uu*. .V t^oatiDg battenfc\ S- ■ 1' »'».p. !i i.,i . .%'vxv>J ii»f tok oi thv be"ii irvi c.iptun^i New Mjiirid,. • '• • I' 1 "..^ 'i> , ■ . .'.'J'.* !s !««>* 'h%- \,\*tttv\i\!ritv •jcstc'cw. By v* renting batteries I. ■Ul • ..HI. i.n,»oii^ iMvtt^Mv >••• i> t'tt* :-i!isyt.T* ot Coiiltrtiencv supplies,. M .« l» ■ I .^ ..'ill ..»! s, ' " « < «» V* «'»«• u' u H. * !K*«»i. S »■ ^J.ip • \ , 7. ''4. 1 862] THE OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 67 moored at the head of the island, was next day cut adrift by a shell from a mortar boat, and the road was open for the Carondelet, On April 4th, a dark and thundery night, the run was made. The Carondelet was protected in her most vulnerable parts by coils of 1 1 -inch hawsers, cables, and lumber. A barge laden with coal and bales of hay was lashed alongside to cover the magazine. Soon after ten o'clock she cast ofF her moorings, and headed down stream through impenetrable darkness, lighted up at intervals by dazzling flashes of lightning. She passed the upper battery with its spiked guns, unseen, but just as she was leaving it behind, the soot in her funnels caught fire, and its glare betrayed her. Signal -rockets went up, and the enemy stood to his guns. The blazing soot was at once put out, but a few minutes later, when she was oppo- site the lower battery, it again took fire and showed the Confederates her position. They opened upon her directly, and their shot flew about her, whilst her pilot, Hoel, stood forward upon her deck exposed to every projectile. The swift current, the sudden bends, and the pitch darkness were worse foes than the batteries. After all but running aground under the muzzles of the Confederate guns she passed the works in safety, without the loss of a man, and reached New Madrid. Two nights later the Pittsburg followed her example. On April 8th, the Federals reaped the harvest which their brilliant audacity had merited, for on that day Island No. 10, with 5000 men, surrendered. The next Confederate work to be assailed was Fort Pillow, on which the combined forces of the North now moved. On May 9th, 1862, Foote, who had been wounded at Fort Donelson, was succeeded by Captain Davis ; and on the following day eight Confederate rams* attacked the Union squadron. These were river steamers with i-inch iron on their bow, and a solid • Their names were the Central Bragg, General Stirling Price, General Sumter, General Van Dorn, General Jeff. Thompson ^ Colonel Lavell, Little XeM, and General Beauregard. F 2 68 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1862 mass of timber strengthening it; they had cotton and pinewood protection round their boilers and engines. At the moment when they made their attack a mortar boat in advance of the Federal ships was bombarding the fort. The Cincinnati^ hastening up to her support, was struck by the Confederate General Bragg on her starboard quarter, and a few minutes later by the rams General Price and General Sumter, She was run in towards the bank in a sinking condition. Follow- ing her, the Mound City was rammed by the Confederate craft and also compelled to make for the bank. The Carondelet f^red better. Three rams assailed her, but she drove all off, putting a shot through the General Sumter^ s steam pipe. On this the Confederates retired having rid themselves of one antagonist. The Mound City was repaired at Cairo, and the Cincinnati raised and put in order. After this attack the Federals provided themselves with faster vessels for the purpose of ramming. Nine river steamers were purchased and strengthened by adding strong timber and iron bracings, whilst 2 feet of oak sheltered the boilers. The two most famous of them were the Monarchy and Queen of the West, commanded by two army officers, brothers, of the name of Ellet.* They soon had an oppor- tunity of displaying their valour. Fort Pillow having fallen on June 4th, after a vigorous bombardment, next day the Federals steamed down to Memphis. The Confederates with eight rams in two lines, disposed abreast, moved up to meet them. In front of the Union squadron were the armoured gunboats, while some distance to the rear, hurrying down stream, were the two Federal rams. As the vessels neared each other the Monarch and Queen of the West passed the slower gunboats, and headed for the enemy. The Queen of the West ran at the Confederate General Lovelly and a bow to bow collision appeared inevitable, when • The names of the others were : Fulton^ Lancaster ^ Lioness, Mingo, Samson, SwiUerland, and Horner, 1 862 J THE OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 69 the Lovell sheered off, and was instantly rammed amidships. The Queen of the West cut the Confederate vessel almost in two, but whilst entangled in her was rammed on each side by a Confederate. Sinking, she made for the land, and reached it with one paddle torn away. Meantime the Monarchy following her, was charged by the Beauregard and Price from opposite sides. They missed her, and ran violently into each other, on which the Monarch turned on the Beauregard. She rammed her, and the unfortunate vessel went to the bottom, having been struck at the instant of collision by a Federal shell, which wrecked her boiler. The Price ran ashore seriously injured. The Little Rebels another Con- federate, was hit in the steam-chest, and also went ashore. The river was full of drowning Confederates, and the horror of the scene was enhanced by the fact that their friends and relations, who had come out to see them fight, expecting an easy victory, were watching on the bank. With splendid humanity, whilst the battle was raging, the Northern gun- boats lowered boats to save their enemies. All the remaining Confederate ships, seeing the fate of their sister vessels took to flight, but two were captured, and another, which took fire during the action, blew up. Only one of the flotilla escaped. Memphis passed to the Federals, and the river was now open to Vicksburg. On June 17th the Mound City captured Fort Charles, on the White River, but with fearful loss. A shot struck her steam - drum, scalding a great number of men, and she had eighty- four killed out of a complement of 175. The time was now at hand when Farragut, moving up from New Orleans, was to join hands, above Vicksburg, with Captain Davis. Proceeding up the river with his worn and battered ships — ships built not for service on rivers but to fight at sea — he received the surrender of Baton Rouge and Natchez. He had no army to take possession of those places as he passed them, but though he had misgivings as to the expediency of a mere naval promenade, his orders were TO IROXCLADS I\ ACTIOS, [1862 peremptory, and he obeyed.* At neither Port Hudson nor Grand Gulf were there strong works as yet, and the dis- embarkation of a battalion at each of these points might have saved an infinity of trouble. On June i8th the Brooklyn and Richmond were at an anchor below Mcksburg, and a few days later the other ships of the squadron, ^-ith seventeen mortar schooners, arrived. The bombardment of the Con- federate works was at once commenced. This was at that time the last Confederate position on the river, and its strength was very great. The guns mounted were well dispersed, so that it was a difficult task to silence them by bombardment. The batteries were constructed, some upon high bluffs, whence they could deliver a plunging fire with the most telling effect : some on the water level. The current was fast, flowing at the rate of three miles an hour ; but notwithstanding these obstacles Farragut determined to run past the forts, and unite his force with Captain Davis' gunboat flotilla above the toii^-n. On June 28th, at 2 a.m., he weighed and moved up to the attack, with his ships in two columns. In the starboard column were the Richmond, Hart/\frdrJii\d Br^i^kSv/t : in the port column, closer together, the /rK*ifmi,>is. O/t^rida. Wissakicki/m. Sci^^ta^ Winona, Pino/ay Ki^rukdiH. and AVftc^^*. .\t 4 a.m. the mortar schooners o^HMitnl. whilst six steamers of the mortar flotilla also helped tv> cv>ver the attack. The ships passed the batteries, going very slowly and receiving little damage. The rigging was cut tv^ piews. and a tVw raking hits were inflicted upon the hulls, but the Cv>nt>derate water batteries were silenced when the sailors arrivevl abreast of them. Just under the Kitterics. i\^mmander l\Almer of the /r(f^m*/is, noticing that a hvMvy tirx^ \\>ts Innn^ vUrxx^teU upon the Hartford, stopped his eu^uu^s and dritte\l dv>wn to support her. But. on Icsirniu^ thsit all was \>elL he once mv>re prc>ceeded up stream, and at o am. the whv>le of Farragut's force, except the i862j THE OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 71 Brooklyn f Kennebec j and Katahdin had anchored above Vicksburg. These ships through a mistake remained below. The losses of the fleet were fifteen killed and thirty wounded. The two fleets, the one ascending, the other descending the river, had thus met, but Vicksburg was as yet unconquered. It was known that on the Yazoo River, which enters the Mississippi a short distance above Vicksburg, an ironclad was approaching completion, so on July 15th the Carondelet, Tyler ^ and Queen of the West, were sent up that river to see in what state she was. This ironclad was known as the Arkansas j she was of Merrimac type, plated with rails three inches thick and carried two 9-inch, two 8-inch, and two 32-pounder smooth- bores, besides four 64-inch rifles. She had ram bows and twin screws, but, as was usually the case with Confederate ironclads, her engines were too weak for her. She had started down the Yazoo a little before the Federal ships moved up it, and came suddenly and unexpectedly upon them. The Tyler was ahead, and at once turned back to warn the tw^o others, which were following. All three raced down stream to escape their formidable enemy, for which they thought themselves no match. All three as they fled poured in upon the Arkansas what fire they could from their stern guns. The Carondelet^ which was the slowest, soon dropped behind, and was repeatedly hit. The Arkansas made a desperate attempt to ram her, but failed, and then passed on ahead. The Caron- delet might have retired from a hopeless contest with dignity at this point, but, instead of doing so, kept on her course behind her, till at last her wheel ropes were shot through, and she was forced to retire to the shore. She had thirteen hits on her hull, and lost thirty killed and wounded. The Arkansas held on her way behind the Tyler and Queen of the West, though her crew had never been on a ship before, and were quite untrained. Her funnel had been shot away, so that she could only steam a mile an hour, and her armour was much battered. But on reaching the Mississippi, without any hesitation she headed for Vicksburg past the 72 JROXCLADS IX ACTIOX. [i86z Federal fleet. Had the Federal ships been on the alert, she 1 ould not have escaped, but they were lying i*4th fires banked and could not get up steam in time to ram her. She passed them, receiving in succession the broadside of each ship, and retaliating with what guns she could fire. Her gallant crew- brought her safe to Mcksburg, though not without heavy loss ; and under the guns of the batteries she came to anchor. Alone, the Lancaster made an attempt to ram her, but was driven off bv a shot. That night Farragut prepared a fresh attack upon the ram. His vessels were to run past the batteries, descending the nver, and each in succession to fire upon the Arkansas. The plan was carried out and much damage was done to the ram, though she was not dest roved. The total Federal losses in these various operations, were thirty-two killed, ten missing, and seventy-two wounded. The damage to the ships was inconsiderable. On July ^.:nd. the Arkansas i»-as attacked once more, this time by the A'jc^.v and Qmten of the West. The Essex first, ^vissing ver%' oK>se to her. fired three 9-inch shots at her case- male, which killed or wounded fourteen of her men; but ihon. i^raiini; her side, rxx^eived a hea\-\- fire before she could iict vUwr. I he 4,>Art*'c ^/ :ke West followed and rammed the t onrcviorAto irv>nclad twice, but could not sink her, and was vOJujH^lled to rx^tirx* much battered and damaged. On Vui^ust ;rvi. hv^wever. the Arkansas* career ended. Whilst und. On the approach of her old ci\ou\Y. the /V.vci. her cv>mmander firevi her and escaped on >hv^re. .\ttoi rvuu\ii>4^ jvast the \ icksburv: batteries a second time, Karra^^ut havl rv^tir\\i tv^ New V>rieans with his ships.* and once JUvHv ihc u\er tivm lvi:on Kou^e tv> Vuksburg passed into iho hauvts v^t the i. oDtv^lcrat^^. Supplies were poured into • An w v%.tN \vi\ vJ'Ku 's lo i»Mt 'Mt» c\»i»»;t».;»;v ivciv-v cc =»rvx*-r« cvvil, and as 1862-3] THE OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 75 the Southern States from Texas by the Red River, and the fatal remissness, which had left Farragut without an army to support his ships, and occupy the positions on the river as they advanced, greatly prolonged the war. The Confederates were triumphant at his retreat, and had only to fear the gun- boats of the river flotilla,, which was now augmented by a number of ** tinclads " — ^vessels, that is to say, protected by bullet-proof iron plate — ^and by five casemated ironclads — the Lafayette^ Choctaw, Chtllicoihey Indianola, and Tuscum^ bia.* Their armour was from 3 inches to i inch thick. The river flotilla was for the next few months occupied in reducing Confederate ports on the Mississippi tributaries, and in patrolling the river itself. On December 12th, 1862, the Cairo was sunk by the explosion of two mines in the Yazoo River. On January 9th, 1863, Fort Hindman, also known as Arkansas Post, was reduced. In the meantime, Sherman and Grant were operating against Vicksburg by land. On February 2nd, the Queen of the West, in broad daylight, ran past the Vicksburg works, and deliberately rammed a Confederate steamer which was moored under the enemy's guns. This audacious feat was followed by a wholesale destruction of Confederate stores and steamers on the river. On February 14th, however, whilst ascending the Red River, the Federal ship was attacked by a battery, and ran aground. Her crew were compelled to abandon her, but escaped in a prize — the Era No, 5. Returning to the Mississippi, the Queen of the West's crew found the Indianola had run past the batteries, and was burning and destroying Confederate stores. The Era No, 5 was sent up the river to communicate with the Federal force before Vicksburg ; but on Februarj' 24th the Indianola came to her end. She was assailed by the Confederate rams, • The Tuscumhia, Jmiianoia, and Ckillicothe were casemate-battery ships of 560 to 300 tons ; the Ckottaw had casemates aft and a light turret forward ; the La/ayrtU h.id a casemate protected by i-inch iron upon i«inch india-rubber. She was a hopeless failure. 74 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1863 Webb, Dr. Batey, and Queen of the West^ the latter of which had been seized bv the Confederates when the Federals abandoned her. The Webb rammed the Indianola at full speed, bow to bow, but, strange to say, neither ship was much the worse. After this, in quick succession, the Queen 4>f the West struck her twice, disabling one of her two rudders, whilst the Webb charged her stern. She ran aground and surrendered, but only to sink ; and some days later the Confederates, who had been attempting to raise her, destroyed her. alarmed by the appearance of a dummy monitor, with funnels made of barrels. This formidable craft, drifting down with the current, quickly ran ashore, but at least served its purpose well. .\fter this spirited action, there ensued a month of operations, the aim of which was to turn Vicksburg, and find a waterway to its rear. But General Pemberton, the Confederate commander at X'icksburg, was as active and enterprising as his Northern adversaries, and checkmated all their attempts. It was in vain that the ships sawed out a jKissag\* thrv>Uijh half-submerged forests, and diverted the waters of the Mississippi to disused and forgotten channels. After exertions, which wert* as fruitless as thev were strenuous, the Northerners had to make up their minds to capture Vicks- burv bv a dirxvt attack. Whilst, however. Grant and Porter* \\e\e thus busied ab<>ve \*icksburg, Farrogut, for his part, havl uvH been inactive K^K^w. .\fter his retreat from before \ icksbur^. the i.\>ntWerates hiid greatly strengthened their dcteuvvs at IVrt Hudson, desirin^r to shut out the Xorthem shijv^ trvMu a rwuh of the ri>er acrv>ss which passed a vast an>vHU\t v^t vvrt\ auvi prvn isivHts draw n from the Red River and the Wc^t l>n the 14th v>( Marv h. iSoj;. he was before the place with his ^huvs !asi\^s.t :v>gv:hor in jvxirs. the Hjrtford and ( . >u • • /A A . t h v^ .^"* vv c, * < a no I .^* 1 5\> i*t\ t he J A* t.- t^jkeia and A vA\ ami laNt anvi atvn\c the l/.>\>\\s;> i^i^.*. ISr.AJ«) N° 10 / / "— /• la V( / / nn*i«/ c _. \^ VICKSBURG PORT HUDSON GRAND GD1.P THE OPENISG OF THE MISSISS/PPI, 75 I Farragiit generally prepared the way for his passage by bombarding tlit.- works whii'h would attack his ships, He docs not apprar to have had any great belief in the efficacy of bombardment pure and simple, but as a preparative he would seem to have considered it valuable. Six mortar schooners opened at 1 1 p.m. that night, and, under cover of their lire, the squadron advanced. On land General Banks* could give support. The night was dark, the smoke of the vessels and the batteries quickly descended in an almost impenetrable curtain upon the water, and great (ires lighted on shore added to the smoke, whilst the light they gave was not sufficient to show the Northerners their way. The Hartford in the van «uRered less from the smoke than the other ships.t Her approach surprised the Confederate gunners, who at first fled from their guns. Thcv quickly returned, however, and poured in a vigorous fire. In spite of this, and in spite of the fact that she touched the ground just under the works, the flagship parsed Fort Hudson with trivial loss, two men being killed or drowned, and two wounded. The Brooklyn was less fortunate. Navigated with infinite care, she passed the main batteries, and only the last remained to be confronted when a plunging shot from it raked her, and damaged or opened her safety valves. Instantly the steam escaped, and the pressure in her boilers fell to gibs. The Brooklyn's engines stopped at once, and when her motive force had thus been lost, the Genesee was not strong enough to drag her for- ward against the five mile current, and she was compelled to repass the batteries and anchor below. Her loss was three killed and fifteen wounded. I'hc Monoriga/iela and Kineo, the next pair, steaming up through the dense smoke, lost «ight of the other vessels, and missing the fairway, ran agroond. The Monongakela injured her rudder and stuck ' Al tki rritlcal moniici t Hm pUo( had 4 <-■«■. tube to Ihv derit. Mahan tuKgm' nuNliw cot.iiirc ^ivcn in Ciencr.il Be.iurrg.ird'ii ofiirial rcpurt. In "Battles and lAMilt-ri,' iv.. 1 1 ; huweviT. he Atates lh.it she rame as close a!t ;ioo yards. ♦ " K:f!dled like a Colander." Yet she had not a man killed. 94 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1863 trivial damage upon the Confederate works, and though they themselves had, with the solitary exception of the Keokuk^ sustained no very serious harm, there was scarcely one which was not in difficulties. Their fire was distressingly slow com- pared to that of their enemies, the conjunction of the 15-inch and ii-inch guns in the same turret was a most unhappy measure, slowing the fire of the smaller gun to the rate of the 15-inch weapon, which could only discharge one shot every seven or ten minutes. The 15-inch shells, which were to have blown in the masonry of Sumter had done nothing of the kind. For that long hour a great crowd of Southerners — mostly ladies, since the men were all fighting for their country — had watched the action with ever-growing exultation as it became more and more certain that the forts could not be silenced. Even the steeples and roofs of the town were crowded, and could be seen at intervals from the ships, closely packed with spec- tators. Admiral Dupont had throughout the fight played, not, indeed, through any fault of his own, a somewhat undistin- guished part. His ship, at a distance of a mile had only fired eight shots, yet she had been struck sixty-five times. When he recalled his monitors, he intended to renew the attack next day, but his intention was changed by the reports of their captains. The Weehawken had been hit fifty-three times, and had her 11 -inch gun temporarily disabled by a shot which bulged in the turret. The Passaids 1 5 -inch smooth-bore was out of action, as the rails on which it ran had been forced together ; the pilot-house roof had been lifted, and the turret itself was jammed for a few minutes ; she had been hit thirty-five times. The Montauk with fourteen hits had hardly suffered at all.* The Patapsco^s 150-pounder had been disabled by an injury to one of the cap squares, which hold the trunnions down, * Her captain complained greatly of the want of vision from the pilot-house, which made it difficult to handle the ship. In all the monitor turrets, flying nuts troubled the gunners considerably. The Ironsides^ armour, on the other hand, behaved well, and there were no flying fragments from it. 1863] THE ACTIONS OFF CHARLESTON. 95 and she had been struck forty-seven times. The Nantucket had been struck forty -seven times ; one port-stopper had been jammed by hits indentingthe turret, and the turret had been disabled for some time. Thirty-six hits had scattered bolts about the interior of the Nahanfs turret and effectually jammed it ; it was not in satisfactory working order for a month ; the steering gear had also broken down, and left the vessel helpless for some minutes.* The Keokuk went down that night and blood-stained clothes were washed ashore from her showing that she had suffered severely. The Northerners had fired altogether only 139 projectiles, of which ninety-six were shell, whilst the Rebel works had discharged 2220, a dispro- portion which alone would explain the issue. Dupont's resolution not again to imperil his shipst was impugned by Chief Engineer Stimers, whom we have met before on board the Monitor, He perhaps more than anyone trusted in these ships, and believed that they must be success- ful. He is said to have gibed at his commander before the action for his hesitation, and after it to have said that the injuries to the monitors were insignificant, and that a deter- mined man could have done more. He was tried by court martial for this offence, and was acquitted, but it is to be noted that the commanders of the ships who gave evidence at the trial, were of opinion that there was nothing to be gained by a further attack. The damage to the Confederate forts was slight. One lo-inch gun was temporarily disabled, one 8-inch smooth-bore burst, and two guns were put out of action for a • A piece of platini; weighinfjr over yolbs was torn from her pilot-house and flung across it, killing the quarter-master, and wounding the pilot. f Dupont to his chief of the staff : " During the few minutes that we were under the heaviest fire of the batteries, half of our turret-ships were in part, or wholly, disabled. We have only encountered the outer line of defence, and if we force our way into the harbour, we have not men to occupy any fort we may take, and we can have no communication with our fon'e outside exrrpt by running the gauntlet We have met with a sad repulse; I shall not turn it into a great disaster." '* Battles and Leaders/' iv., 41. 96 IRONCLADS IN ACTION, [1863 few minutes by slight injuries * Seven men were wounded, but only one died from the effect of his wounds. The Northern- ers lost three killed and eleven woujided. The attack upon the Charleston forts had thus issued in the repulse which Ericsson predicted. Never before had ships so invulnerable been in action, and probably never again will so many hits be inflicted with such trivial damage and such slight loss of life. If the impenetrable monitor could do nothing against forts garrisoned by resolute men and efficiently armed, what hope of success could our Royal Sovereigns or Majesties have ? Artillery has progressed so much that cannon can be mounted on land which can pierce armour thicker than any ship can hope to carry. Considerations of weight and dis- placement limit the protection which can be given to the ship, whilst they have no such determining influence on the fort. The ironclad's armour and ordnance then are limited ; the fort's unlimited. How can the two fight on an equal footing? There are these further considerations too, to be taken into account. The guns must be crowded into a limited space on board ship, where several may be silenced by a single lucky shot. In the fort a wide space can intervene between each weapon, and if properly mounted, each gun must be actually struck before it is put out of action. Then too, the fort's fire can be directed upon the ship's water-line ; hits here will be every whit as efficacious as upon her battery, and she can be driven off without a single one of her guns being struck. Thus a close attack by ships upon forts has become almost impossible, though it is beyond doubt perfectly feasible for war vessels to run through an unobstructed channel, commanded by forts however numerous. The Southern authorities saw this, and therefore placed torpedoes and palisades across the channel. The modern theory of attack upon forts is a long range bombardment, but this pre- supposes the fact that the situation of the fort is known to * Fort Sumter was hit in all fifty-five times out of 139 rounds fired, which gives the percentage of hits as forty — exceedingly good practice. i863j THE ACTIONS OFF CHARLESTON. 97 the assailant, which may not always be the case. And it may be questioned whether the enormous range of modern rifled ordnance will not be found delusive, if such a bombardment b ever attempted. Accurate as our heavy guns are at short distances, how many shells from a 68-ton gun would fall within the space of an acre at six or seven miles ? Against large towns or dockyards such tactics might be successful, but it IS very doubtful whether forts could be thus silenced ; and, in any case, the waste of ammunition would be immense. The counterpart of this theory is found as far back as 1863, when wc see Ericsson urging repeated night attacks upon Fort Sumter. The monitors lay low in the water and offered a very small target, whilst the fort was large and conspicuous. The forts could not have returned the fire of the fleet with any accuracy, and, in the words of General Beauregard, the Southern commander, " this plan of attack could have been repeated every night until the walls of the fort should have crumbled under the enormous missiles which made holes two and a half feet deep in the walls, and shattered the latter in an alarming manner. I could not then have repaired during the day the damages of the night, and I am confident now, as I was then, that F^ort Sumter if thus attacked, must have been disabled." But the Northern fleet retired from the contest, and was content to maintain the blockade. It was the minrs and obstructions which influenced Dupont in this course of action, and he did well to refuse to risk his ships amongst them. His successor tried every expedient, but obtained no more success. Shortly after this failure the news reached Washington that a new and formidable ironclad of the Merrimac type was being constructed at Savannah. Hearing this, Dupont despatched the two monitors, Weehawken and Nahanty to look after her. The ship of which they were in search was building in Ossabaw Sound, a little to the south of Savannah. This new vessel, called the Atlanta, was a reconstructed English ship which had gone by the name of the Fingal. H 98 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [i 86 1-3 She had only been lately launched on the Clyde, and was a fine fast steamer of about fourteen knots, when the Confede- rate Commissioners in England purchased her. The Fingal left England in safety in the autumn of 1861, ostensibly upon the errand of blockade running. After a brief delay at Bermuda she reached Savannah, and was prepared for com- mission as a Confederate commerce-destroyer.* But the Con- federates had great need of battleships, whilst they had no foundries capable of constructing engines or machinery ; hence it was decided to convert her into an ironclad. Her upper works were removed to the water-line. Upon the iron hull thus left was fastened timber to the height of 27 inches, and this great structure of logs was carried out 6 feet from her sides, tapering down to the level of her lower deck, 8 feet below the water-line, where it ceased. Upon this massive platform, which protected her against the ram, was constructed a casemate amidships, with sides inclined at an angle of twenty-nine degrees. First came a row of pine logs placed horizontally, and then a second vertical layer, the thickness of the two being 15 inches. On this again were fastened 3 inches of oak, and over all two layers of iron plating, each 2 inches thick and 7 wide, the inner horizontal and the outer vertical. The plates were fastened down with I J inch bolts, having washers and nuts inside the vessel. The armour was carried down to a depth of 3 feet, outside the timber overhang, and the angle the inclined side made with the deck was filled in with timber till the total thickness of the side, on the level of the gun-deck, was nearly 7 feet. The length of the ship was 204 feet, and her beam 41. Her pilot house rose 3 feet above the casemate, and was formed by the prolongation of the sides. Forward she had a sharp prow, and she was fitted with a spar torpedo. Her battery comprised two rifled 7-inch guns, mounted on pivots for^\^ard and aft, and firing ahead and astern, or on either broadside, • In January, 1862, the entrances to the port of Savannah were closed by sinking hulks laden with stone, and thus the Fingal was caught in a trap. 1863] THE ACTIONS OFF CHARLESTON. 99 with two loo-pounder rifles, one on either broadside. She was pierced with eight gun-ports, each covered by two j-inch plates rivetted together, and hung upon a pivot at the top corner. When the guns were to be fired the port- lids were raised by a chain which was attached to their bottom corner, and on the guns being run in, fell back covering the port, by their ow n weight. The speed of the ship in battle trim was about eight knots, or two knots faster than the monitors. A second vessel after her pattern was under construction, and great things were expected of the two by the Southerners. With a hundred and sixty-five officers and men on board, and with provisions for an extended cruise, the Atlanta set out from Savannah on June 17th. She was accompanied by a large number of Southerners on steamers, anxious all of them to see the Yankees soundly beaten. They had not the .slightest doubt that their trusted ironclad would be a match and more than a match for the monitors. The Weehawken and Sahant, seeing her coming, at once slipped their cables and stood out to sea. The Atlanta followed them, only too anxious to trj' her mettle. She had not long to wait. A few minutes later the monitors, having secured ample sea room for their manctuvres, turned and headed towards her. At a dis- tance of a mile and a half she fired a 7-inch shot, but missed. The Weehawken closed with her, and fired her 15-inch gun at a range of 300 yards. The projectile struck the casemate and was not deflected; it shattered the brittle, badly-rolled armour, and drove a huge hole through the side, carrj'ing btfore it splinters of iron and wood, which wrought dreadful havoc among the gunners. Sixteen were wounded by that single shot. The Atlanta fired most ineffectively, not one of her shots hitting the target. This is hardly to be wondered at when it is remembered that she was manned almost entirely by landsmen, who could be expected to do little against the .seasoned crews of the Federal ships. She next varied the situation by running hard aground, and was unable to get off H 2 loo IRONCLADS IN ACTION, [1863 before the Weehawken had struck her pilot-house with a second 15-inch shot, which wounded four men and wrecked the structure. A third struck the starboard amidships port- lid and shattered it, starting the wall of the casemate from the deck. After a short engagement lasting only fifteen minutes, the Atlanta^ s commander, recognising that his enterprise was hopeless and that his ship was entirely at the mercy of her opponents, hauled down his flag. He had fired only eight shot and his antagonist five. Nothing is more surprising than the ease with which such a ship, manned it is to be presumed by determined men, was reduced to submission.* The moral of the story is that an untrained crew who are bound to each other by no ties of discipline or friendship — a chance con- glomeration of individuals — cannot fight trained men. Had the Atlanta's 7-inch rifle-shot struck the Weehawken they might have perforated her laminated plating, and the ships would have been on equal terms. But even then there was the Nahant to be reckoned with, which had, through no fault of her own, remained a spectator through the action. The Atlanta^ after the fight, was refitted and served as a Northern guardship in Hampton Roads. Admiral Dupont's failure to achieve the impossible, and his plain statement of the damage inflicted upon the monitors in an hour's fighting, had not endeared him to the Navy Depart- ment. Though his want of success against Sumter had been in some measure redeemed by this success of his subordi- nates, he was removed from his command and superseded by Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, a great artillerist, who had less dislike for the " tin-kettle " which the progress of naval science had provided in the monitor. He arrived on July 4th, and resolved at once to attack the place a second time. • In justice to the Confederates we must give their version of the story, which is, that the Atlanta ran fast aground whilst attempting to use her torpedo against the Weeharoken ; that she then careened over, and was unable to bring a single gun to bear. But Lieutenant Webb, the Confederate commander on board, makes the significant admission that her men were at once demoralised. — Scharf, 644-5. iS63] THE ACTIONS OFF CHARLESTON. loi Again the impossible was attempted. The first of his series of unsuccessful assaults was made six days after his arrival, when, with his flag on board the Catskill^ he led four monitors to the attack at four in the morning. He was supported by thf Union land batteries, and his assault was delivered, in the first instance, not upon the works at the entrance to the harbour but upon the defences which protected Lighthouse Inlet, to the south of Morris Island. Here he was successful, and when these were silenced, he advanced to the attack of Fort Wagner, approaching it about 9.30. Though it only mounted a small number of guns, the action was protracted for nine hours before the monitors retired. Their crews had suflfered terribly from the extreme heat, which led to a brief withdrawal about midday. The injuries to the ships were by no means severe. Sixty shots had struck the Catskill, but, as Admiral Dahlgren reported, •' she came out of action in good working order." The other monitors were only struck in all eight times. The fort was little the worse for the bom- bardment. On August 17th another attack was made. On this occasion the Wcehawken carried Dahlgren 's flag, and led the way soon afttT six. Fort Wagner was silenced, but the Northerners lo.st an officer of great promise in Commander Rodgers,* who was killed in the CatskilVs pilot-house, whilst directing her in the action. A shot struck the top of the pilot-house, breaking the outer plate, and tearing a huge fragm(»nt off the inner plate. Bolts and fragments were driven in with great violence, and by these Captain Rodgers and his paymaster were killed instantly, whilst the pilot and the master were wounded. The action lasted about six hours, and in it the New Ironsides was struck thirty-one times, eleven times upon her defenceless rnds. None of the ships were seriously damaged. On August 23rd a night attack was made upon Sumter. The fort was hidden from the ships by fog for some of the time, but the fire • G. W. Rodn^cn. J. Rodgers wa* in command oC the Wetkmmkrn. I02 IRONCLADS IN ACTION, [1863-4 was still maintained, as the bearings had been taken by the stars. Again, on September ist, Sumter was assailed by night, and on this occasion the fort was nearly silenced, though the ships were hit seventy-one times. The worst injury' was sustained by the Weehawken, A shot struck the base of her turret, and, by driving in fragments, wounded her captain. There was no other ironclad engagement of any importance before Charleston. The South was little behind the North in ingenuity and inventiveness. Having no hope of overcoming the monitors by open force, the Southerners determined to try stealth, and turned their attention to torpedo warfare. A torpedo section for the protection of the coast had been formed at the com- mencement of the war, but at first it offered a merely passive defence by the use of fixed mines and submarine batteries. It now launched forth upon more active measures, amongst the first of which was the construction of boats, either wholly submerged or capable of being sunk till they were flush with the water. Not that there was anything new in submarine craft. During our great war with France a vessel of this description had been brought under the notice of the English Admiralty, who refused to have anything to do with it, not, apparently, because they doubted its capacity to do harm, but because its universal adoption might have imperilled our maritime supremacy. In the war of 18 12 it was taken by its inventor, Fulton, to the United States, and, running under the hull of H.M.S. RamillieSy as she lay off New London, its crew nearly succeeded in boring through her bottom before want of air brought them to the surface. Early in 1863 a gunboat at Charleston was cut down, and converted into a half-submerged torpedo-boat. It appears, however, to have been abandoned, though it may have been the vessel which, on the night of April 19th, 1864, approached the Wabash. The Northern vessel was at anchor when something was seen near her in the water, and challenged. She slipped her cable and went ahead, opening a heavy fire upon the strange craft, 1863-4] THE ACTIONS OFF CHARLESTON. 103 after which it disappeared, whether as the result of a shot or not, is uncertain. A more determined and dangerous attack was made upon the Ironsides on October 5th. The boat used was built by Theodore Stoney, at Charleston, and was named the David ^ a term which was subsequently applied to all submarine craft. She was 54 feet long, cigar-shaped, and at her widest 6 feet in diameter. She was propelled by a screw, which was driven by steam-power. When in fighting trim she lay almost flush with the water, her funnel and steering-chamber alone pro- jecting above the surface. A spar torpedo was fitted to her : it was folded alongside when not in use, and was only run out for the actual attack. With a crew of volunteers. Lieutenant Glassell took her out, and, a little after nine in the even- ing, the Ironsides' watch saw her approaching. She looked to them like a plank, since all that could be seen was the coaming of her hatchway. Several officers were on deck, and the David was at once hailed. Her only answer was a volley of musketr)', which mortally wounded one F'ederal officer. An instant later, the ironclad received a violent blow from the explosion of a torpedo, which threw up a great column of water, .shook the ship severely, and brokt* one man's leg on board her. After the smoke and spray had cleared away, the Ironsides was found to be uninjured, but the boat had disappeared. Her crew jumped overboard at the moment of firing the torpedo, and Glassell, as he swam about, hailed a Northern coal schooner, on board which he was taken, whilst a second man escaped to the Ironsides. The engineer of the David, however, after the explosion, swam back to the boat, to which he found the pilot clinging for dear life, as he was unable to swim. Helping him on board, he discovered that the David could yet float, though the explosion had put out the fires, and together the two took her back to Charleston. A much more .successful attempt was made on the Ilousa- tonic by a submerged boat, February 17th, 1864. This boat 104 IRONCLADS IN ACTION. [1863-4 was built at Mobile, and brought overland to Charleston. She had lateral fins by which she could be raised or submerged, and ballast tanks to lighten her and enable her to rise to the surface, though these uniformly refused to act. She carried no reserve of air, and hence she proved a peripatetic coffin. On her trial she drowned eight men ; she was raised only to go down once more through the inrush of water into an open manhole, caused by the wash of a steamer. Lieutenant Payne, her commander, alone escaped by leaping out of her as she went down. Raised again, she sank again, and again Lieu- tenant Payne escaped, this time with two companions. A third time she was raised, and a fourth time sank, having caught her nose in the bottom, and on this occasion all on board were drowned. Once more she was recovered only to foul the cable of a schooner at anchor in the harbour, and to sink for the fifth time. She was recovered yet again, and Lieutenant Dixon, with Captain Carlson, both officers of the Confederate army, volunteered with five others to take her out against the Northern fleet. Their heroism was rewarded, and they exploded their torpedo under the Housatonic, which sank rapidly, drowning ^vt, men. All on board the submarine-boat perished. A year or two after the war she was found by divers on the bottom, a hundred feet from her opponent; and the men on board her were still at their posts. Certainly the South did not want brave men. A word may here be given to the Southern torpedo depart- ment. From first to last torpedoes accounted for thirty-two ships of which four were monitors and three armoured gun- boats. Most of these losses were due to fixed or floating torpedoes, and very few to boat attacks. Attempts were made upon the Memphis in Edisto River in March 1864, ^^^ upon the Minnesota whilst at anchor in Hampton Roads in April of the same year.* Neither of these was successful. There were other explosions which may have been caused by • Table XXV. 1862-4] THE ACTIONS OFF CHARLESTON. 105 torpedoes, though we cannot be certain, since the Confederates employed a particularly deadly engine, which was called a Coal Torpedo. It looked like a lump of coal, but was really a block of cast iron containing lolbs. of powder, and would when placed in the fires of a boiler at once explode, bursting the boiler. Such a torpedo might be planted with effect in stores of coal at a coaling station in case it was certain that they would fall into the enemy's hands. Clockwork torpedoes were also employed, and one of these was used at City Point, James River, on August 9th, 1864. It was placed on board a barge, which was loading with ordnance stores for the Federal Army, by two Confederates disguised as workmen, with the rrmark that the captain had ordered it to be put there. It exploded and destroyed a large number of barges and vessels. CHAPTER V. The Exploits and Destruction of the Albemarle, April to October, 1864. Albemarle Sound is a deep inlet in the coast of North Carolina, running back some sixty miles from the sea. As on many parts of the Southern coast, we find here an inner sea inclosed by islands and sandy spits, and from this Albemarle Sound branches off. The narrow passage between the northern and southern portion of this inner sea, just south of Albemarle Sound is commanded by Roanoke Island which had been captured by a Federal Expedition, supported by the fleet, early in 1862. The Confederates saw with alarm the presence of the Northerners in these waters which gave access to the heart of North Carolina, and, indeed, threatened the rear of their army before Richmond. They made two ineffectual attempts to expel their enemies from Pamlico Sound which lies to the south of Albemarle Sound, but on each occasion their attempts were foiled, mainly by the naval forces of the North. It became evident to them that their only road to success was through the naval control of the inland sea, and to secure this they needed ironclads. The work of constructing an armoured vessel of Merrimac type was intrusted to Captain Cooke, a Southern naval officer of great ability. The vessel was laid down some miles up the Roanoke, at Edward's Ferry, in an open cornfield, early in 1863. As usual there was the greatest difficulty in procuring iron for her armour and bolts. Captain Cooke scoured the country far and wide for the precious metal, carrying off old i863j DESTRUCTION OF THE ALBEMARLE. 107 rails, bars, and bolts, till he became known as the ** Iron- monger Captain." The design was prepared by Constructor Porter who had planned the Merrimac, but as the vessel was sunk early in her career, we lack precise particulars. She was built in great haste of unseasoned wood ; her length was 122 feet, her breadth 45 feet ; whilst the draught was only 8 feet. The casemate, placed amidships, was protected by some 2 feet of pine with two layers of 2-inch iron plate over it. To forge bolts, and work up on the spot the iron that was obtained, her constructor had no large engineering shops, but only an open blacksmith's forge. The engines procured from the Tredegar Works, at Richmond, were two, each driving one screw, and had a nominal horse-power of 100 apiece. The armour was rolled at the same works. The armament of tlu- Albemarle^ as she was called, was not particularly formidable. She carried two loo-pounder rifles, one forward and the otlurr aft. Both pivoted, and could be used for end-on or broadside fire. The Northern commanders were fullv aware of the con- slruction of the Albemarle, but whilst the naval officers who would have to meet her. were filled with apprehension, they in vain urged the general* commanding the land forces to join them in an expedition whose object should be her destruction. The general either could not or would not see that she was any menace to him. She was nearing completion on April 1 8th, 1864, when, with unusually high water she descended the river. All that morning and afternoon the workmen were busy putting the last touches, whilst her crew were drilling at her two guns. Ten portable forges were on board, and Captain Cookt*. standing on the pilot-house, gave his orders : ** Drive in spike No. 10." alternated with "Load with cartridge"; ••(Jn nut. and screw up hard," with "Load with shell — prime." At five in the afternoon her forges were landed, her flecks eleared. and the ship made ready for action. At three • (iviier.il F«»NtiT. io8 IRONCLADS IN ACTION, [1864 o'clock in the early morning of April 19th, the high water enabled her to pass the obstructions which the Northerners had placed across the river to prevent her descent. On her way down she was fired upon by a Federal battery at Warren's Neck, whilst picket boats also gave the alarm. In the river was Lieutenant Flusser, of the United States Navy^ having with him the gunboats Miami and Southfield. He had fastened them together by spars and chains, intend- ing to catch the ram of his opponent between them, and then board her. Captain Cooke, however, was one too many for the Northerners. Whilst the gunboats waited for him in mid-stream, he took the southern side of the channel, under a sharp fire from them, which did his armour not the smallest harm. Then, as he approached the two Federal vessels, he charged the Southfield^ which was nearest to him, turning across the river at full speed. His ram went ten feet into her ; the two ships were entangled, and instantly the Southfield began to sink, carrying down with her the Confederate iron- clad. The Albemarle^s bows were right under water, and a flood was pouring in through her forward ports, when the Southfield rolled off her ram, and allowed her to right herself. The Southfield went to the bottom with most of her crew. Whilst the Albemarle was thus held fast by the Federal gun- boat, Flusser, on board the Miamiy had aimed, at very close quarters, a 9-inch shell at her side. It struck nearly at right angles, was shattered, and the fragments flew back on him, instantly killing him. Seeing that nothing could be done, the Miami steamed down the river, thus leaving the Con- federates in possession of the upper waters of Albemarle Sound. Admiral Lee, who was the Federal commander, at once despatched a considerable flotilla of wooden ships, under Captain Melancton Smith, to watch the Albemarle. Amongst these were the Sassacus, Mattabesett, Wyalusing and Miami — all light-draught paddle-steamers. The Miami was fitted with a spar-torpedo, and with nets to foul the Albemarle s I864J DESTRUCTIOX OF THE ALBEMARLE. 109 propeller. The instructions to the Northerners were to fire on the ports of the Confederate ship, to j^^et dose alongside, to hold her till she could be torpedoed, and to use the ram. On May 5th, the Albemarle came down to battle, accom- panied by two smaller vessels. Her crew were all landsmen, and she had no trained gunners, so that the disparity of strength was not so great as it appeared. At 4.40 she opened fire on the Federal ships, and a few minutes later two heavy shells from her struck the Mattabcsctt, wounding six men. The Albemarle followed up her broadside, and strove to ram, but the Mattabesett, with a great superiority in speed, was easily abh* to elude her. The two ships passed close, and a tremendous tire was con- centrated up>on the Albemarle by the gunboats, which wertr steaming up, delivering their broadsides, then turning above the ram and repeating their fire. On the Albemarle thr funnel was riddled, and the outer layer of j)lates much cracked ; the boats were torn away, and one gun was injured. At ten minutes to six the first and last attempt to ram was made by the Federals. The Sassacus, 400 yards from the ironclad, backed to g«-t full room to strike her blow: then with a full head of steam, using oil and cotton waste in her furnaces, bounded on the Albemarle. She struck her with a speed of eight or ten knots, on the starboard quarter, depressing the Albemarle s stern and twisting her own bows badlv in the collision. The il//i7w/ should have been al hand to plant her torpedo under the Confederate, but she was handled unskilfullv and failed t<» hit her. Meanwhile the current swung thr Sassacus round so that the ram's guns could be brought to bear upon her. Two loolb. shelI^ were fired into her ; the first j)assing right through her, the second piercing a boiler and filling the ship with steam. The crew suffered terribly : thirteen men wen* scalded, some fatally, whilst the utmost confusion pre- vailed. At th<' height of the turmoil the cry of **boaiders'* was raised, but the efforts of the C'onfederates to carrv her in this way were n»pelled by the small-arms men, who fire